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CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

SURVEY SAYS?: U.S. CITIES DOUBLE DOWN ON
CIVILIAN OVERSIGHT OF POLICE DESPITE
CHALLENGES AND CONTROVERSY
Sharon R. Fairley†

The emergence of police accountability as an issue of concern in communities
across the nation has led to a watershed era in the evolution of accountability
systems involving civilian oversight of municipal police agencies. In recent years,
several municipalities have opted to either create or enhance existing civilian
oversight systems, despite the fact that many civilian oversight entities continue to
elicit criticism. This Article reports on a survey of the civilian oversight entities in
the one hundred most populous U.S. cities. The survey documents that civilian
oversight has become sufficiently prevalent among the largest U.S. cities as to now
be considered a normative element within the police accountability infrastructure.
This Article also sheds light on the prevalence of the various civilian oversight
functions that the largest U.S. cities employ. Each civilian oversight entity is
identified as providing one or more of seven oversight functions: Investigative,
Review, Audit, Adjudicative, Appeals, Supervisory, and Advisory oversight. The
survey illustrates the prevalence of these forms of oversight across U.S. jurisdictions
and reveals the recent proliferation of layered, multi-functional civilian oversight
systems, particularly among the largest cities.

† Professor From Practice, University of Chicago Law School; former federal prosecutor; and
former Chief Administrator, City of Chicago Independent Police Review Authority and Civilian
Office of Police Accountability. Special thanks to Alexis Grinsted for her stellar research
assistance. Thanks also to Craig Futterman, Brian Friedman, and Walter Katz for their insightful
comments and suggestions. For access to detailed information from the survey discussed in this
Article, please visit policeoversight.uchicago.edu.
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The Article draws on recent trends identified through the survey that
illuminate the current challenges inherent in civilian oversight of municipal police
agencies. This Article is intended to serve as a resource for civilian oversight
professionals as well as local government leaders and community members who are
advocating for new or revised oversight systems.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................... 3
I.

A SURVEY OF CIVILIAN OVERSIGHT IN THE 100 MOST POPULOUS U.S. CITIES:
INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY ................................................................ 7
A. Information Sources ............................................................................... 7
B. Classification of Oversight Entities ....................................................... 8
C. List of Cities and Tercile Analysis ......................................................... 9

II. THE PREVALENCE OF CIVILIAN OVERSIGHT IN THE 100 MOST POPULOUS U.S.
CITIES ................................................................................................................ 9
A. Civilian Oversight Has Reached Critical Mass: A Majority of the
Largest U.S. Cities Have Established an Entity Performing at Least
One Form of Civilian Oversight ............................................................ 9
B. The Review Function is the Most Prevalent Form of Civilian Oversight,
Followed by the Investigative Function ............................................... 10
C. Many Jurisdictions Have Adopted Multi-Layered Civilian Oversight
Systems, with One or More Entities Providing Multiple Forms of
Oversight .............................................................................................. 11
III. RECENT CHANGES AND ADDITIONS TO CIVILIAN OVERSIGHT SYSTEMS ......... 14
A. Jurisdictions that Have Recently Initiated Civilian Oversight by
Establishing New Entities .................................................................... 15
1. Anaheim, California .................................................................. 15
2. Aurora, Colorado ....................................................................... 15
3. Nashville, Tennessee ................................................................. 16
4. Newark, New Jersey .................................................................. 17
5. Omaha, Nebraska ...................................................................... 17
6. Tampa, Florida .......................................................................... 18
7. Wichita, Kansas ......................................................................... 18
B. Jurisdictions that Have Recently Added New Oversight Entities to
Existing Oversight Systems .................................................................. 18
1. Baltimore, Maryland.................................................................. 18
2. Buffalo, New York .................................................................... 19
3. New York, New York................................................................ 19
4. St. Louis, Missouri .................................................................... 20
5. Sacramento, California .............................................................. 21

2020]

CIVILIAN OVERSIGHT OF POLICE

3

C. Jurisdictions that Have Recently Redesigned or Restructured Civilian
Oversight Systems ................................................................................ 21
1. Austin, Texas ............................................................................. 21
2. Chicago, Illinois ........................................................................ 23
3. Dallas, Texas ............................................................................. 24
4. Seattle, Washington ................................................................... 25
5. Oakland, California ................................................................... 25
6. Albuquerque, New Mexico ....................................................... 26
D. Jurisdictions that Have Recently Enhanced the Powers of Existing
Oversight Entities ................................................................................. 27
1. Atlanta, Georgia ........................................................................ 27
2. Boston, Massachusetts ............................................................... 27
3. Denver, Colorado ...................................................................... 27
4. Houston, Texas .......................................................................... 28
5. San Antonio, Texas ................................................................... 29
6. San Francisco, California .......................................................... 29
7. St. Paul, Minnesota .................................................................... 30
IV. LONGEVITY OF CIVILIAN OVERSIGHT ENTITIES............................................... 30
V. KEY IMPEDIMENTS TO EFFECTIVE CIVILIAN OVERSIGHT................................. 33
A. Lack of Independence........................................................................... 33
B. Legal Impediments to Transparency .................................................... 36
C. Lack of Actual or Perceived Neutrality ................................................ 39
D. Continued Backlash from Police Unions and Leadership ................... 43
1. Chicago, Illinois ........................................................................ 43
2. Cincinnati, Ohio ........................................................................ 44
3. Newark, New Jersey .................................................................. 44
4. Tennessee .................................................................................. 45
5. Tulsa, Oklahoma ....................................................................... 46
E. Sub-Optimization of Powers Resulting from Compromise ................... 46
F.

Perceived Lack of Professionalism or Expertise .................................. 49

CONCLUSION .......................................................................................................... 50
APPENDIX A: ENTITIES CREATED JANUARY 2014 TO JUNE 2019 ............................ 52
APPENDIX B: CIVILIAN OVERSIGHT ENTITIES CREATED IN 1999 OR EARLIER ........ 53

INTRODUCTION
The emergence of police accountability as an issue of concern in
communities across the nation has led to a watershed era in the evolution
of accountability systems involving civilian oversight of municipal police
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agencies. In the past five years, a seemingly never-ending series of
controversial police use-of-force incidents have achieved national media
attention, sparking debate within communities and on the national stage
about policing and police accountability.1 These incidents, and the way
city administrations handle them, have laid bare deficiencies in the
effectiveness and transparency of police accountability systems across
the United States. Concerned communities have demanded change, and
city leaders have responded by creating or revamping structures that
enable civilian oversight of police.2
The concept of civilian involvement in the handling of policemisconduct complaints was considered radical when it first emerged in
the 1920s as a potential way to enhance police accountability.3 Although
the first oversight entity was not formally recognized until 1948,4 the
concept of civilian oversight of law enforcement dates back to at least
1931, when the National Commission on Law Observance and
1 The following are some of the more widely publicized incidents in recent years: the July 17,
2014, in-custody death of Eric Garner in New York City; the August 9, 2014, fatal shooting of
Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri; the November 22, 2014, shooting of Tamir Rice in
Cleveland, Ohio; the October 20, 2014, fatal shooting of Laquan McDonald in Chicago; the April
4, 2015, fatal shooting of Walter Scott in Charleston, South Carolina; the April 12, 2015, in-custody
death of Freddie Gray in Baltimore; the July 2015 in-custody death of Sandra Bland in Waller
County, Texas; the July 6, 2016, fatal shooting of Philando Castile in Falcon Heights, Minnesota;
and the September 16, 2016, fatal shooting of Terence Crutcher in Tulsa, Oklahoma. See Jonathan
Allen et al., Factbox: U.S. Police Officers Who Killed Unarmed Black Men Often Avoid Criminal
Liability, REUTERS, Aug. 19, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-police-garner-factbox/
factbox-us-police-officers-who-kill-unarmed-black-men-often-avoid-criminal-liabilityidUSKCN1V91MT [https://perma.cc/K8ST-45S7]; Kayla Epstein, ‘So Much Mystery’: A Man
Went to Resolve a DUI. He Died at a Prison Days Later., WASH. POST (June 8, 2019, 12:41 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2019/06/06/he-went-resolve-dui-warrant-two-days-laterhe-died-prison [https://perma.cc/86ZH-8VLR] (discussing the jail death of Sandra Bland); Kori
Rumore & Chad Yoder, Minute by Minute: How Jason Van Dyke Shot Laquan McDonald, CHI.
TRIB. (Jan. 18, 2019, 7:32 PM), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/laquan-mcdonald/ct-jasonvandyke-laquan-mcdonald-timeline-htmlstory.html [https://perma.cc/Y5S9-RHDM] (discussing
the fatal shooting of Laquan McDonald in Chicago).
2 For example, in Chicago, a task force was created to address police accountability issues
after significant public outcry. CHI. POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY TASK FORCE, RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR REFORM: RESTORING TRUST BETWEEN THE CHICAGO POLICE AND THE COMMUNITIES THEY
SERVE 1 (2016) https://chicagopatf.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/PATF_Final_Report_4_13_
16-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/7R6Y-ALUA]. The task force recommended a number of changes to
Chicago’s police accountability infrastructure, many of which were adopted by a city ordinance,
including the creation of the City’s Civilian Office of Police Accountability and Deputy Inspector
General for Public Safety. See CHI., ILL., CODE, ch. 2-78 (2019); id. §§ 2-56-205 to -280.
3 Justina R. Cintrón Perino, Developments in Citizen Oversight of Law Enforcement, 36 URB.
LAW. 387, 387 (2004).
4 Historians of the subject recognize the Complaint Review Board, created in 1948 in
Washington, D.C., to oversee the Washington Metropolitan Police Department, as the first civilian
oversight entity. Samuel Walker, The History of Citizen Oversight, in CITIZEN OVERSIGHT OF LAW
ENFORCEMENT: LEGAL ISSUES AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 1, 3 (Justina Cintrón Perino ed.,
2006), http://apps.americanbar.org/abastore/products/books/abstracts/5330089samplech_abs.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5WNX-FGJW].
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Enforcement, also known as the Wickersham Commission, issued a
report suggesting that “every locality” should have a disinterested agency
to which citizens could report police abuse.5
In the nearly eighty years since the first civilian entity was formed
to address police accountability, the concept of civilian oversight has
been broadly recognized as a way for community interests to
independently check police conduct.6 Communities are more frequently
looking to civilian oversight as a way to enhance police accountability
across a variety of fronts.7 For example, the Police Oversight Advisory
Working Group, established in 2018 in Austin, Texas, has identified five
key priorities that should guide the design and structure of Austin’s police
accountability infrastructure: (1) to foster independence from the police
department and from “political actors”; (2) to facilitate the process of
lodging complaints or compliments about police officers; (3) to “establish
a collaborative relationship” between the police department and the
community; (4) to enhance transparency through data analysis and
reporting; and (5) to “involve community stakeholders in the process.”8
Looking across the broad array of models and systems nationwide,
it seems that civilian oversight systems are like snowflakes—no two are
alike.9 But despite civilian oversight’s increasing prevalence, its success
nationwide is often the subject of debate.10

5 The National Commission on Law Observation and Enforcement, or the Wickersham
Commission, was established in 1928 by the Los Angeles Bar Association over concerns about
police involvement in the illegal liquor industry. Tim Prenzler, Scandal, Inquiry, and Reform: The
Evolving Locus of Responsibility for Police Integrity, in CIVILIAN OVERSIGHT OF POLICE:
ADVANCING ACCOUNTABILITY IN LAW ENFORCEMENT 3, 8–9 (Tim Prenzler & Garth den Heyer
eds., 2015) [hereinafter CIVILIAN OVERSIGHT OF POLICE]. The commission found widespread
corruption including the use of torture and intimidation to coerce confessions. Id.
6 Prenzler, supra note 5, at 5.
7 See Geoffrey P. Alpert et al., Citizen Oversight in the United States and Canada: Applying
Outcome Measures and Evidence-Based Concepts, in CIVILIAN OVERSIGHT OF POLICE, supra note
5, at 179, 180 (“When allegations of excessive force, racism, and other forms of misconduct and
corruption surface, citizens question the foundation on which the police authority is based and
departments’ abilities to control the actions of their own officers. . . . To address these
shortcomings, stakeholders have called for citizen oversight agencies to investigate and adjudicate
claims of police misconduct and corruption.”).
8 OFFICE OF THE POLICE MONITOR, CITY OF AUSTIN, POLICE OVERSIGHT ADVISORY
WORKING GROUP RECOMMENDATIONS 11–12 (2018) [hereinafter AUSTIN OVERSIGHT
RECOMMENDATIONS], https://www.austintexas.gov/sites/default/files/files/Police_Monitor/OPM_
Working_Group_FNLReport_FINAL_WEB.pdf [https://perma.cc/BMJ2-37EL].
9 Mark Iris, Police Discipline in Chicago: Arbitration or Arbitrary?, 89 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 215, 217–18 (1998).
10 DAVID A. HARRIS, GOOD COPS: THE CASE FOR PREVENTIVE POLICING 104 (2005)
(describing the variation in success of oversight agencies nationwide: “Some have performed well;
others have failed utterly; still others have hobbled along for years without being of much use to
anyone.”).
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Throughout the twentieth century, a “continuing pattern of police
abuse, misconduct, and corruption, coupled with the failure of
government to address these problems in a transparent way, led to a
movement of citizen involvement in the police accountability process.”11
In the 1960s, concerns about police racism frequently sparked calls for
civilian oversight.12
In recent years, many civilian oversight entities have elicited
criticism as concerned community members have grown disappointed by
their performance.13 Despite these ongoing challenges, several
municipalities have recently opted to either start up or enhance the
powers of existing civilian oversight entities.14 Many jurisdictions have
made changes intended to achieve more effective oversight that is better
equipped to satisfy citizen concerns, and those changes have led to the
creation of more complex, multi-tiered systems.15
These recent developments have resulted in a critical mass of
civilian oversight systems. A survey16 of entities in the one hundred most
populous U.S. cities indicates that civilian oversight has become
sufficiently prevalent among them as to now be considered a normative
element within the police accountability infrastructure.
Many cities that have recently adopted new or enhanced structures
for civilian oversight have done so to comply with reforms required by
settlement agreements with the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ).17

Alpert et al., supra note 7, at 181.
Prenzler, supra note 5, at 9.
13 See, e.g., Mission Failure: Civilian Review of Policing in New York City, 1994–2006, N.Y.
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, https://www.nyclu.org/en/mission-failure-civilian-review-policing-newyork-city-summary-findings [https://perma.cc/H79K-Q8JF]; see also City Officials Hold Hearing
About Department that Investigates Citizen Complaints Against Police, NEWS 5 CLEVELAND (May
8, 2019, 9:57 AM), https://www.news5cleveland.com/news/local-news/city-officials-holdhearing-about-department-that-investigates-citizen-complaints-against-police [https://perma.cc/
QWH9-5ZSM].
14 See infra Part III for a discussion of civilian oversight entity creation and revision in the past
five years: Section A identifies jurisdictions that have initiated civilian oversight, Section B
discusses new oversight entities recently added to existing civilian oversight systems, and Section
C discusses civilian oversight systems that have been redesigned.
15 For example, in 2017, Seattle revamped its civilian oversight system, creating a three-tiered
approach comprised of: the civilian-led Office of Police Accountability, an investigative agency;
the Community Police Commission, which engages the community on oversight issues; and an
independent Office of the Inspector General, which reviews the quality of disciplinary
investigations and audits the Office of Police Accountability’s and Seattle Police Department’s
management practices and policies to “ensure the City maintains police reforms.” See
Organizations Charged with Civilian Oversight of the Police, SEATTLE.GOV, https://
www.seattle.gov/civilian-oversight [https://perma.cc/B9DT-PM6U].
16 For
access
to
detailed
information
from
the
survey,
please
visit
policeoversight.uchicago.edu.
17 For example, in 2017, Baltimore created the Community Oversight Task Force to comply
with a DOJ consent decree. Community Oversight Taskforce (COTF), BALT. POLICE DEP’T, https://
11
12
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However, many entities were created not because of legal prompting, but,
rather, in response to community activism.18 Although controversial
police use-of-force incidents are frequently the impetus behind new
civilian oversight initiatives, some jurisdictions have undertaken
preemptive reforms to enhance public trust in accountability systems.19
I. A SURVEY OF CIVILIAN OVERSIGHT IN THE 100 MOST POPULOUS U.S.
CITIES: INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY
Despite the debate and controversy that continues to swirl around
civilian oversight,20 a recent survey of the one hundred most populous
U.S. cities indicates that support for civilian oversight of police continues
to expand and evolve as more cities introduce oversight and as other cities
create more complex, multi-tiered oversight systems.
A.

Information Sources

Because issues related to policing and police accountability tend to
have greater salience in larger, more urban jurisdictions, the survey
discussed herein was intended to focus on the largest U.S. cities.
Accordingly, the survey was based on the Modern Cities Top 100 US
Cities Ranked by 2017 Population list, which is derived from U.S. Census
population data.21 Information about existing civilian oversight entities
was gathered through internet searches and is derived from one or more
of the following types of sources: state statutes; municipal ordinances or
other applicable legislation; online information and documentation, such
as entity websites; entity rules and policy statements; and local news
www.baltimorepolice.org/transparency/community-oversight-taskforce-cotf
[https://perma.cc/
676R-34ZE].
18 For example, in 2019, Austin, Texas, embarked on a series of reforms based on
recommendations from a civilian oversight working group. See AUSTIN OVERSIGHT
RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 8.
19 For example, the idea for Wichita’s Citizen’s Review Board, in part, grew out of a Wichita
State University study released in 2015 that looked at the Wichita Police Department’s structure
and practices. Amy Renee Leiker, Wichita Police Will Soon Have Citizen Review. Can It Be
Effective?, WICHITA EAGLE (Nov. 6, 2017, 6:40 AM), https://www.kansas.com/news/local/
article182669481.html [https://web.archive.org/web/20180829053501/https://www.kansas.com/
news/local/article182669481.html].
20 See Kevin King, Note, Effectively Implementing Civilian Oversight Boards to Ensure Police
Accountability and Strengthen Police-Community Relations, 12 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J.
91, 100–04 (2015) (discussing the issues fueling the debate over the powers and effectiveness of
the various types of civilian oversight entities).
21 Ennis Davis, Top 100 US Cities Ranked by 2017 Population, MODERN CITIES (May 24,
2018),
http://www.moderncities.com/article/2018-may-top-100-us-cities-ranked-by-2017population [https://perma.cc/5MKN-9DUC].
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articles. The survey focused exclusively on oversight of municipal police
departments. Therefore, information about county-wide oversight
systems was not included.22
B.

Classification of Oversight Entities

Based on the available information, each identified civilian
oversight entity was classified as providing one or more of the following
oversight functions:
Investigative: An entity that investigates police incidents
independently from the police department and that employs at least
one professional investigator.
Review: An entity that reviews or monitors investigations of police
incidents being conducted by the police department.
Audit: An entity that audits investigations of police incidents
conducted by the police department. For purposes herein, an auditing
entity reviews only a sample of investigations, rather than reviewing
all investigations or all investigations of a certain type.
Adjudicative: An entity that adjudicates specific disciplinary matters
by making findings and recommendations at the conclusion of a
disciplinary hearing or other proceeding.
Appeals: An entity that reviews outcomes of disciplinary
investigations upon the request of either the complainant or the
accused officer.
Supervisory: An entity that makes high-level policy and strategic
decisions regarding police department operations.
Advisory: An entity that makes recommendations to the police
department regarding high-level policy and operational strategies.23

The above classifications were not considered mutually exclusive,
as many agencies provide more than one of these oversight functions.

22 Civilian oversight has expanded to include coverage of county-wide law enforcement
entities. For example, the Los Angeles County Office of Inspector General audits and reviews the
Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department’s operations, including through periodic use-of-force
assessments. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., CTY. OF L.A., https://oig.lacounty.gov [https://
perma.cc/7XC3-RWG9]. A survey of these systems would be an appropriate area for future
research.
23 Commentators have categorized civilian oversight entities in a variety of ways. The author
developed this particular classification scheme based on the findings of this one hundred–city
survey. For an example of another, similar classification scheme, see Cintrón Perino, supra note 3,
at 388–89.
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List of Cities and Tercile Analysis

The civilian oversight entities identified as providing at least one of
the seven oversight functions to a city on the Top 100 list were analyzed
to assess the prevalence of civilian oversight among the cities overall, as
well as the prevalence of each type of oversight.
A tercile analysis compared both the prevalence and types of
oversight employed in the most and least populous U.S. cities. This
analysis involved separating the cities in the Top 100 list into three
terciles based on population ranking: the most populous thirty-three cities
were assigned to the Top Tercile, the least populous thirty-four cities
were assigned to the Bottom Tercile, and the remaining thirty-three cities
were assigned to the Middle Tercile.
II. THE PREVALENCE OF CIVILIAN OVERSIGHT IN THE 100 MOST
POPULOUS U.S. CITIES
A. Civilian Oversight Has Reached Critical Mass: A Majority of the
Largest U.S. Cities Have Established an Entity Performing at Least One
Form of Civilian Oversight
As outlined in Figure 1 below, sixty-one of the one hundred cities
surveyed have at least one entity that performs one of the seven oversight
functions: Investigative, Review, Audit, Adjudicative, Appeals,
Supervisory, or Advisory.

As might be expected, oversight agencies were more prevalent
among the most populous cities. As outlined in Figure 2 below, 85% of
the Top Tercile cities had a governmental entity that performed at least
one of the seven oversight functions. That number fell to 61% among the
Middle Tercile cities and to 35% among the Bottom Tercile cities.
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The Review Function is the Most Prevalent Form of Civilian
Oversight, Followed by the Investigative Function

Among the one hundred cities surveyed, the most prevalent form of
civilian oversight was the Review function. As outlined in Figure 3
below, 38% of the cities presently operate a civilian oversight agency that
provides the Review form of oversight. The next most prevalent form of
oversight was the Investigative function, which can be found in 21% of
the one hundred cities surveyed. A smaller, yet still significant, number
of cities have entities that perform other civilian oversight functions:
Advisory, 15%; Appeals, 13%; Supervisory, 11%; Adjudicative, 9%; and
Audit, 7%.24

24 A total of sixty-one of the one hundred cities surveyed, or 61%, operate an entity providing
at least one of the seven oversight functions. Because many jurisdictions operate one or more
entities that provide more than one form of oversight, the total of the percentages in Figure 3 is
greater than 61%.
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As outlined in Figure 4 below, the more populous cities are more
likely to have entities providing the Investigative and Review oversight
functions. The less populous cities are more likely to have the Review
and Advisory models of oversight and less likely to have the Supervisory,
Adjudicative, and Audit forms of oversight.

C. Many Jurisdictions Have Adopted Multi-Layered Civilian
Oversight Systems, with One or More Entities Providing Multiple
Forms of Oversight
As outlined in Figure 5 below, more than half of the sixty-one cities
which have at least one form of oversight employ two or more forms of
civilian oversight. Some cities have separate entities performing different
functions. For example, Chicago currently has three separate civilian
oversight entities, with each performing a separate oversight function: the
Civilian Office of Police Accountability (COPA) primarily performs the
Investigative function, the Public Safety Inspector General (PSIG)
primarily performs the Audit function, and the Chicago Police Board
(CPB) primarily performs the Adjudicative function.25 Each of these
entities also provides Advisory oversight because they each have the
power to make policy recommendations to the police department.26
Many other cities have a single civilian oversight entity that
performs two or more oversight functions. For example, in Milwaukee,
the Milwaukee Police and Fire Commission performs the Investigative,
Review, and Adjudicative functions.27
25 The jurisdiction and function of each of these agencies is outlined in their respective city
ordinances. See CHI., ILL., CODE ch. 2-78 (2019) (COPA); id. ch. 2-56 (PSIG); id. ch. 2-84 (CPB).
26 See id. § 2-78-120(m) (COPA); id. § 2-56-230(d) (PSIG); id. § 2-84-030(3) (CPB).
27 Milwaukee, Wis., Rules of the Board of Fire and Police Commissioners r. XV, § 3 (2019),
https://city.milwaukee.gov/ImageLibrary/Groups/cityFPC/Rules/FPCRules.pdf
(stating
that
Commission staff will “conduct an investigation of every complaint received”); id. r. XV, § 6
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As might be expected, and as outlined in Figure 6 below, multiple
layers of civilian oversight are more likely to be found in the more
populous jurisdictions. Almost one-third of the Top Tercile cities employ
three or more civilian oversight functions. The Bottom Tercile cities are
most likely to employ only one or two forms of oversight.

(stating that the Executive Director of the Commission has the power to review investigations
conducted based on complaints filed with the police department); id. r. XVI (describing the rules
and procedures for the adjudication of disciplinary matters before the Commission).
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As outlined in Figure 3 above, the most prevalent form of oversight
is the Review function. As outlined in Figure 8 below, more than half of
the cities that employ the Review function also employ another form of
oversight, and the Supervisory form of oversight is always employed in
conjunction with at least one other form of oversight.

Similarly, it is notable that, although twenty-one of the one hundred
cities surveyed employ the Investigative function of oversight, only four
do so exclusively. The remaining seventeen complement the
Investigative function with other forms of oversight.
As outlined in Figure 9 below, the most prevalent combinations of
oversight functions among the jurisdictions that employ more than one
form of civilian oversight are: (1) the Review function combined with the
Investigative function, and (2) the Review function combined with the
Advisory function. Each of these combinations is found in ten of the cities
surveyed.
The Investigative function is also frequently paired with the
Supervisory function. Each of the five cities that combine the
Investigative function with the Supervisory function utilize the “police
commission” form of oversight.28

28 The five jurisdictions that employ both the Investigative and Supervisory oversight functions
include: San Francisco, California; Detroit, Michigan; Oakland, California; Milwaukee, Wisconsin;
and Seattle, Washington. S.F., CAL., CHARTER §§ 4.109, .136 (2019) (the Department of Police
Accountability provides the Investigative function, while the Police Commission provides the
Supervisory function); DETROIT, MICH., CHARTER §§ 7-802 to -804 (2012) (the Office of the Chief
Investigator provides the Investigative function and reports to the Board of Police Commissioners,
which provides Supervisory oversight); OAKLAND, CAL., CODE §§ 2.45.020, .46.010 (the
Community Police Review Agency provides the Investigative function, while the Police
Commission provides Supervisory oversight); MILWAUKEE FIRE & POLICE COMM’N, CITY OF
MILWAUKEE, HOW TO FILE A COMPLAINT, https://city.milwaukee.gov/ImageLibrary/Groups/
cityFPC/Brochures/Complaint_Brochure.pdf [https://perma.cc/58XF-MYAU] (the Milwaukee
Fire and Police Commission provides both Investigative and Supervisory oversight); Office of
Police Accountability, SEATTLE.GOV, http://www.seattle.gov/council/issues/past-issues/opa
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III. RECENT CHANGES AND ADDITIONS TO CIVILIAN OVERSIGHT
SYSTEMS
Despite the challenges oversight providers have faced across the
country, many jurisdictions have responded to community demands for
improved police accountability by creating new entities29 or by
strengthening the capabilities of existing entities.30
The survey identified at least twenty-two new civilian oversight
entities established since 2014.31 Reflecting the trend toward multifunctional and tiered oversight systems, fifteen of the twenty-two were
established to serve alongside other civilian entities by performing one or
more additional oversight functions.32 The remaining seven entities were
newly established as the sole civilian oversight entity within the
jurisdiction.33

[https://perma.cc/8MCZ-3VA9] (the Office of Police Accountability serves as the Investigative
function and the Community Police Commission provides the Supervisory function).
29 See infra Sections III.A–B.
30 See infra Section III.D.
31 See infra app. A for a list of the entities.
32 See infra app. A.
33 See infra app. A.
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Jurisdictions that Have Recently Initiated Civilian Oversight by
Establishing New Entities
1.

Anaheim, California

In 2014, Anaheim launched a two-year pilot program regarding
civilian police oversight.34 The City created the Public Safety Board in
response to protests and civilian unrest that erupted following two fatal
officer-involved shooting incidents.35 In 2018, the City formally
established the new Police Review Board.36 According to its website, the
Board receives “real-time input on major police incidents,” reviews
current and proposed police department policies, and reports statistics on
officer-involved shootings, uses of force, and complaints.37 Anaheim also
employs the Los Angeles–based Office of Independent Review (OIR) as
an external auditor for its police department.38
2.

Aurora, Colorado

In 2014, Aurora, Colorado, created the Independent Review Board,
a new civilian oversight group to advise city leaders on how to handle
police disciplinary matters.39 The Board was created in response to local
and national protests against controversial police use-of-force incidents.40
The Board, which was seated in June 2018, weighs in on discipline to be
imposed in cases involving “in-custody deaths, traffic collisions that
result from emergency vehicle operations and pursuits, and alleged biased
policing.”41

34 Police Review Board, CITY OF ANAHEIM, https://www.anaheim.net/4802/Police-ReviewBoard [https://perma.cc/8JVN-ZRYR].
35 Thy Vo, Anaheim Moving Toward Creation of a New Police Review Board, VOICE OF OC
(Dec. 7, 2017), https://voiceofoc.org/2017/12/anaheim-moving-toward-creation-of-a-new-policereview-board [https://perma.cc/VLB7-YHAJ].
36 Police Review Board, supra note 34.
37 Id.
38 POLICE REVIEW BD., CITY OF ANAHEIM, FACT SHEET (2019), https://www.anaheim.net/
DocumentCenter/View/23165/Police-Review-Board-fact-sheet-summer-2019 [https://perma.cc/
2VHA-HLJC]. OIR Group is not considered a governmental oversight entity for the purposes of
this survey.
39 See Aurora Offers Final Contenders for New Police Discipline Review Board, SENTINEL
(Dec. 8, 2014), https://sentinelcolorado.com/news/independent-review-board-list-finalized
[https://perma.cc/2376-BKN5].
40 Id.
41 Id.
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Nashville, Tennessee

For many years, activists have called for some kind of civilian
oversight of the Metro Nashville Police Department (MNPD).42 In the
1990s, the NAACP called for civilian oversight in the wake of a fatal
officer-involved shooting.43 Since 2012, Nashville community groups
have grown increasingly concerned about police violence in Black
communities.44
In November 2017, legislation proposing the creation of an
independent community oversight board was introduced before the
Nashville Metro Council.45 However, in January 2018, the Council voted
against holding a public hearing on the proposal, even though the City
had already appropriated money to create the agency.46 Despite that
setback, support for civilian oversight prevailed. In November 2018, a
city-wide referendum on an amendment to the City’s charter creating the
Community Oversight Board passed with overwhelming support.47 The
Metro Council appointed eleven members to the Board in January 2019.48
The Board was to be up and running by March 29, 2019.49 The Board has
the power to investigate allegations of misconduct, issue policy
recommendations, and review or audit MNPD’s complaint processes.50

42 The
Coalition,
CMTY.
OVERSIGHT
NASHVILLE,
https://
communityoversightnashville.wordpress.com/about [https://perma.cc/CR4C-GMJV] (last updated
Nov. 2017).
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Joey Garrison, Nashville Amendment 1 for Police Oversight Board Passes Overwhelmingly,
TENNESSEAN (Nov. 7, 2018, 11:59 AM), https://www.tennessean.com/story/news/politics/tnelections/2018/11/06/nashville-amendment-1-police-oversight-board-appears-track-passage/
1734253002 [https://perma.cc/ZD6C-UH5B].
48 Meet the 11 Members of Nashville’s New Police Oversight Board, TENNESSEAN (Jan. 23,
2019,
9:12
AM),
https://www.tennessean.com/story/news/2019/01/23/nashville-policecommunity-oversight-board-who-11-members/2655942002 [https://perma.cc/E6JA-PSPY].
49 Id.
50 Community Oversight Board, CITY OF NASHVILLE, https://www.nashville.gov/Government/
Boards-and-Committees/Committee-Information/ID/132/Community-Oversight-Board.aspx
[https://perma.cc/S9Q8-H6AZ] (“The Board shall have the power to investigate allegations that
[MNPD] officers have committed misconduct against members of the public, as well as issue policy
advisory and resolution reports assessing allegations of misconduct by MNPD, recommendations
to agencies involved in public safety and the administration of justice, and have the option of
establishing a monitoring program that provides an ongoing review or audit of the complaint
process administered by the MNPD Office of Professional Accountability (OPA) or equivalent
internal affairs program in MNPD.”).
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Newark, New Jersey

In 2014, the DOJ issued a report stating that its investigation of the
Newark Police Department (NPD) uncovered, among other operational
issues, a pattern or practice of constitutional violations in NPD’s stop and
arrest practices.51 The report also highlighted serious deficiencies in
NPD’s accountability system.52 In response to the DOJ’s findings, the
Newark Municipal Council in March 2016 established the Citizens
Complaint Review Board.53 However, the police union immediately
challenged the Board’s legality.54 As a result, the Board was prevented
from performing its duties for several months while the City litigated the
Board’s oversight powers.55 In June 2019, a New Jersey appellate court
sided with the City and reinstated most, but not all, of the Board’s
investigatory powers.56
5.

Omaha, Nebraska

In 2014, Omaha established the Citizen Complaint Review Board.57
The Board has jurisdiction over appeals of the outcomes of administrative
complaint investigations when the complainant requests a review. 58 The
structure and powers of the new entity were the product of collaboration
between the mayor, police leadership, and the police union.59

51 Fraternal Order of Police, Newark Lodge No. 12 v. City of Newark, 212 A.3d 454, 462 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2019).
52 Id. at 462–63.
53 Id. at 463.
54 Rebeca Ibarra, Newark Judge Weakens Police Review Board, WNYC NEWS (Mar. 15, 2018),
https://www.wnyc.org/story/newark-judge-weakens-board-meant-fight-police-wrongdoing
[https://perma.cc/8ZQR-A9AG]; see also infra Section V.D.
55 Ibarra, supra note 54.
56 In March 2018, a New Jersey Superior Court judge stripped the newly created entity of
virtually all of its investigatory powers, precluding the agency from investigating misconduct,
holding hearings, issuing subpoenas, and making recommendations. Fraternal Order of Police, 212
A.3d at 461. However, the appellate court reinstated most of these powers. There were only two
areas where the appellate court found the city ordinance infringed on officer’s rights: (1) making
the agency’s findings of fact binding, and (2) permitting the disclosure of the identities of the
complainant and the officers. Id.
57 Omaha, Neb., Exec. Order No. S-30-15 Amended (Aug. 10, 2016).
58 Id.
59 Citizen Board Will Review Complaints Against Police Officers, MAYOR JEAN STOTHERT,
CITY OF OMAHA, https://mayors-office.cityofomaha.org/city-news/53-citizen-board-will-reviewcomplaints-against-police-officers [https://perma.cc/5FUC-ALSQ].
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Tampa, Florida

In 2015, Tampa launched the Citizens Review Board, a new entity
that reviews completed disciplinary cases and issues of importance to the
community.60 The Board was formed out of the conflict between the
police and city residents over the disproportionate ticketing of Black
bicyclists.61 The Review Board reports its findings to the Chief of Police
and, when appropriate, may make recommendations for possible policy
changes.62
7.

Wichita, Kansas

In 2017, Wichita established the Citizen’s Review Board based on
suggestions arising from a 2015 Wichita State University study of the
City’s police department.63 The Board provides “assistance in policy
development, education and communications related to racial and other
biased-based policing.”64 The Board also reviews “post discipline
findings of the Professional Standards Bureau in alleged officer
misconduct matters upon the request of the Chief of Police.”65
B.

Jurisdictions that Have Recently Added New Oversight Entities to
Existing Oversight Systems
1.

Baltimore, Maryland

In 2017, pursuant to a consent decree with the DOJ, Baltimore
established a new Community Oversight Task Force.66 The Task Force is
charged with identifying and recommending reforms for Baltimore’s

60 Citizens Review Board, CITY OF TAMPA, https://www.tampagov.net/city-clerk/citizensreview-board [https://perma.cc/2LDH-S9SK].
61 Charlie Frago, Tampa’s Police Oversight Board Enters Third Year with Mixed Reviews,
TAMPA BAY TIMES (Feb. 3, 2018), https://www.tampabay.com/news/localgovernment/Tampa-spolice-oversight-board-enters-third-year-with-mixed-reviews_165041683
[https://perma.cc/
6SUX-33AC].
62 Citizens Review Board, supra note 60.
63 Amy Renee Leiker, Wichita Police will Soon Have Citizen Review. Can It Be Effective?,
WICHITA EAGLE (Nov. 6, 2017, 6:40 AM), https://www-1.kansas.com/news/local/
article182669481.html [https://perma.cc/W3JX-SVFT].
64 Wichita Citizen’s Review Board, WICHITA POLICE DEP’T, https://www.wichita.gov/WPD/
Pages/CitizenReviewBoard.aspx [https://perma.cc/HR2B-K7YM].
65 Id.
66 Community Oversight Taskforce (COTF), supra note 17.
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civilian oversight system, which already includes the Civilian Review
Board created in 1999.67
2.

Buffalo, New York

In 2017, facing increasing community concerns regarding the
conduct of Buffalo police officers, the City agreed to form a community
advisory board.68 At that time, the Buffalo Police Department was
overseen by the Buffalo Common Council’s Police Oversight
Committee.69 In May 2018, the Buffalo Common Council unanimously
adopted a resolution that created the Community Advisory Board, made
up of eleven residents, to make recommendations to the Common
Council and the Buffalo Police Department.70 The Board conducts public
meetings to hear community concerns and reports its findings and
recommendations to the Common Council’s Police Oversight
Committee.71 The Community Advisory Board complements the
oversight provided by the Police Oversight Committee.
3.

New York, New York

A 2014 amendment to the New York City Charter created a new
Audit function within the City’s Department of Investigations to oversee
the New York City Police Department (NYPD).72 The Office of the
Inspector General (OIG) for NYPD, which complements the oversight
provided by the long-standing Civilian Complaint Review Board,73 has
Id.
Daniela Porat, City Hall Agrees to Increased Police Oversight, INVESTIGATIVE POST (Sept.
26, 2017), http://www.investigativepost.org/2017/09/26/city-hall-agrees-to-increased-policeoversight [https://perma.cc/SD4E-6DG5].
69 See Deidre Williams, New Community Advisory Board to Augment City’s Police Oversight
Committee, BUFFALO NEWS (Mar. 8, 2018), https://buffalonews.com/2018/03/08/new-communityadvisory-board-to-augment-citys-police-oversight-committee
[https://perma.cc/QYE4-YSN4].
The Buffalo Common Council is the legislative branch of government for the City of Buffalo.
Common Council, CITY OF BUFFALO, https://www.buffalony.gov/362/Common-Council [https://
perma.cc/H6KN-RCCC].
70 Williams, supra note 69. See generally Common Council Res. 18-423 (Buffalo, N.Y., 2018).
71 Common Council Res. 18-423.
72 Local Law 70, Council Int. No. 1079, (N.Y.C., N.Y., 2013), https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/
doi/oignypd/local-law/Local-Law-70.pdf [https://perma.cc/3ZH2-MH2A].
73 See Frequently Asked Questions, INSPECTOR GEN. FOR THE NYPD, https://www1.nyc.gov/
site/doi/oignypd/faq.page [https://perma.cc/EB99-9PXJ] (noting the OIG “was not established to
replicate the investigative functions of the Civilian Complaint Review Board (CCRB) or NYPD’s
Internal Affairs Bureau (IAB)”). The Civilian Complaint Review Board was established in 1953.
History, CIVILIAN COMPLAINT REV. BOARD, https://www1.nyc.gov/site/ccrb/about/history.page
[https://perma.cc/L47D-L4EA].
67
68
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the authority to “investigate, review, study, audit and make
recommendations relating to the operations, policies, programs and
practices, including ongoing partnerships with other law enforcement
agencies, of the [NYPD].”74
In the wake of the police use-of-force incident that resulted in the
death of Eric Garner, the NYPD OIG reviewed incidents involving the
use of chokeholds.75 The review raised significant questions about how
diligently the NYPD had enforced its chokehold ban. The review also
outlined concerns about the disciplinary process in general and the related
interactions between the NYPD and the Civilian Complaint Review
Board.76
4.

St. Louis, Missouri

The St. Louis Board of Police Commissioners has governed the St.
Louis Metropolitan Police Department, pursuant to a Missouri state
statute, since around 1861.77 But, in 2014, the City created the Civilian
Oversight Board to receive complaints and monitor the Police
Department’s internal investigations.78 The Board was formed to
“provide an additional level of transparency and accountability” for
police oversight,79 but its creation was not unanimously welcomed. A
January 2015 meeting of the City’s Public Safety Committee “turned into
a melee between protestors and police” when police officers spoke out
against creating the Board.80 Notwithstanding the controversy, the City
in mid-2018 took the additional step of granting the Board subpoena
power.81

Local Law 70.
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN. FOR THE NYPD, N.Y.C. DEP’T OF INVESTIGATION,
OBSERVATIONS ON ACCOUNTABILITY AND TRANSPARENCY IN TEN NYPD CHOKEHOLD CASES ii
(2015), https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/doi/oignypd/response/chokehold_report_1-2015.pdf [https://
perma.cc/C25S-E6YJ].
76 See id. at ii–vi.
77 Historical Milestones, ST. LOUIS METROPOLITAN POLICE DEP’T, https://www.slmpd.org/
history.shtml [https://perma.cc/4FEU-UGDY].
78 Bd. B. 208, 2014–2015 Sess. (St. Louis, Mo., 2015).
79 Alvin Reid, St. Louis City’s Civilian Oversight Board Is in Operation and Has Received
Calls, ST. LOUIS MAG. (May 11, 2016, 9:01 AM), https://www.stlmag.com/news/st-louis-city%
E2%80%99s-civilian-oversight-board-is-in-operation-and [https://perma.cc/L3S2-287Y].
80 Ryan Krull, St. Louis’ Civilian Oversight Board Almost Always Agrees with Internal Affairs,
RIVERFRONT TIMES (Apr. 2, 2018, 6:30 AM), https://www.riverfronttimes.com/newsblog/2018/
04/02/st-louis-civilian-oversight-board-almost-always-agrees-with-internal-affairs
[https://
perma.cc/R76V-JZJM].
81 St. Louis Aldermen Give Police Civilian Oversight Board Subpoena Power, FOX 2 NOW
(Apr. 27, 2018, 5:50 AM), https://fox2now.com/2018/04/17/st-louis-aldermen-give-policecivilian-oversight-board-subpoena-power [https://perma.cc/5JQM-YCYP].
74
75
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Sacramento, California

Civilian oversight was initiated in Sacramento in 1999 with the
creation of the Office of Public Safety Accountability, which tracks and
monitors serious police-misconduct investigations.82 In 2016, the City
added the Community Police Review Commission to its oversight
structure.83 The new entity was created to review and recommend police
department policies and practices and to “monitor the implementation,
evaluation, and sustainability of city policing initiatives and programs.”84
C.

Jurisdictions that Have Recently Redesigned or Restructured
Civilian Oversight Systems

Some jurisdictions have recently responded to upheaval and
controversy regarding police accountability by completely overhauling
their accountability systems. The following are a few examples of
systems that have been redesigned since 2014.
1.

Austin, Texas

In 2018, Austin, Texas, began dismantling its police oversight
infrastructure while simultaneously planning to rebuild it based on “best
practices.”85 Austin has had civilian oversight of its police department
since 2001, when the City created the Citizen Review Panel and the
Office of the Police Monitor pursuant to the City’s contract with the
Austin Police Association.86 However, much has transpired in the
intervening years, creating new issues and calls for reform.87 In a June
2018 report, the Austin City Auditor concluded that citizen oversight had
not created substantive change within the Austin Police Department,
largely due to City procedures and police department practices. 88 In
particular, the Auditor identified several impediments to successful
82 About the Office of Public Safety Accountability, CITY OF SACRAMENTO, https://
www.cityofsacramento.org/OPSA/About [https://perma.cc/B2R2-ZGT7].
83 See SACRAMENTO, CAL., CODE § 2.110.010 (2019).
84 See id. § 2.110.020.
85 AUSTIN OVERSIGHT RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 8, at 4.
86 Nina Hernandez, Police Oversight: Starting From Scratch, AUSTIN CHRON. (Sept. 14,
2018), https://www.austinchronicle.com/news/2018-09-14/police-oversight-starting-from-scratch
[https://perma.cc/4HW9-VP2D].
87 Id.
88 OFFICE OF THE CITY AUDITOR, CITY OF AUSTIN, EFFECTIVENESS OF CITIZEN POLICE
OVERSIGHT 5 (2018), http://www.austintexas.gov/sites/default/files/files/Auditor/Audit_Reports/
Effectiveness_of_Citizen_Police_Oversight_June_2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/U3QF-4QK9].
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oversight, including: (1) that city policies prevented the Citizen Review
Panel from communicating directly with the police chief; (2) that the City
did not establish a system for keeping track of the Panel’s
recommendations; (3) that the time lag between critical incidents and
when the police department presented a case to the Citizen Review Panel
limited the panel’s ability to issue effective and timely recommendations;
(4) that incomplete or unavailable information impacted the Citizen
Review Panel’s recommendations; and (5) that the police chief was not
required to acknowledge the receipt of or respond to the Panel’s
recommendations.89
When the police union contract came up for renegotiation in 2017,
the City looked to enhance civilian oversight, but the union pushed
back.90 When the contract expired, it became virtually impossible for the
Citizen Review Panel to continue operating.91 In early 2018, the Austin
City Council directed the City Manager to develop evidence-based best
practices regarding police oversight and to deliver to the Council
recommendations to improve the effectiveness, transparency, and
efficiency of the City’s current accountability system.92 The Police
Oversight Advisory Working Group issued a report in October 2018
detailing a series of recommendations for Austin’s civilian oversight
infrastructure.93
For much of 2018, the City and the union remained at odds over
civilian oversight and budget issues.94 The impasse lasted for
approximately nine months, which was quite unusual based on their prior
negotiating history.95 Fortunately, in late 2018, the parties reached a
consensus.96 The new agreement allowed for several enhancements to the
oversight structure, including giving the oversight entity the power to
investigate anonymous misconduct complaints97 as well as the authority
to lodge its own complaints.98 However, even with these enhancements,

Id.
Hernandez, supra note 86.
91 See id.; Mark Wilson, Citizen Police Oversight Did Not Create Change at APD, Audit Finds,
AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN (July 24, 2018, 12:01 AM), https://www.statesman.com/news/
20180724/citizen-police-oversight-did-not-create-change-at-apd-audit-finds/1 [https://perma.cc/
7956-QKLT].
92 AUSTIN OVERSIGHT RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 8, at 4.
93 Id. at 8–26.
94 Hernandez, supra note 86.
95 Id.
96 See Agreement Between the City of Austin and the Austin Police Association, Nov. 15, 2018,
http://www.austintexas.gov/edims/document.cfm?id=310410 [https://perma.cc/RT6P-5KCA].
97 Id. art 16, § 2(b) (“The Parties specifically agree that anonymous written or verbal
communications meet [the] definition of ‘Complaint.’”).
98 Id. § 2(c) (“[T]he [Office of Police Oversight] “may act as complainant in any allegation on
its own initiative . . . .”).
89
90

2020]

CIVILIAN OVERSIGHT OF POLICE

23

the new contract does not provide subpoena power for the Citizen Review
Panel.99
2.

Chicago, Illinois

In October 2016, the Chicago City Council passed legislation
intended to reform the City’s police accountability system, which had
come under fire in the wake of the officer-involved shooting of Laquan
McDonald.100 The new ordinance replaced the agency responsible for
police-misconduct investigations, the Independent Police Review
Authority (IPRA), with the new Civilian Office of Police Accountability
(COPA).101 The ordinance expanded the civilian agency’s jurisdiction to
include allegations of improper searches and seizures and the
responsibility to investigate certain incidents involving motor vehicle
deaths.102 The new agency was provided additional resources via a budget
floor and the power to obtain legal advice independent of city
attorneys.103 The City Council also added to the police accountability
infrastructure by creating and funding the new Deputy Inspector General
for Public Safety position.104
Some Chicago police accountability activists and community groups
are advocating for the creation of a community board to oversee both the
Chicago Police Department and the COPA.105 An ordinance has been
presented to the City Council’s Public Safety Committee that would
create a new nine-member Community Commission for Public Safety.106
99 Michael Barajas, New Contract Could Give Austin One of the Most Transparent Police
Departments in the Country, TEX. OBSERVER (Nov. 16, 2018, 4:10 PM), https://
www.texasobserver.org/new-contract-could-give-austin-one-of-the-most-transparent-policedepartments-in-the-country [https://perma.cc/HY8J-ARDJ].
100 Our History, CIVILIAN OFF. OF POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY, https://www.chicagocopa.org/
about-copa/our-history [https://perma.cc/6FK8-887P]; see Curtis Black, Demand for Community
Control of Police Oversight Isn’t Going Away, CHI. REP. (Oct. 6, 2016), https://
www.chicagoreporter.com/demand-for-community-control-of-police-oversight-isnt-going-away
[https://perma.cc/GAQ8-758L].
101 CHI., ILL., CODE ch. 2-78 (2019). The author of this Article served as the Chief Administrator
for the IPRA and its successor agency, COPA, from December 2015 through early October 2017.
102 See id. § 2-78-120.
103 Id. § 2-78-105 (establishing a minimum budget for the agency at one percent of the annual
appropriation for the Chicago Police Department); id. § 2-78-120(q) (allowing the Chief
Administrator to retain outside counsel to advise and represent the agency in proceedings related
to its investigative work).
104 Id. § 2-56-200 to -280.
105 Annie Sweeney, Revamped Ordinance for Community Oversight of Chicago Police
Department Faces Likely Uphill Battle, CHI. TRIB., (Mar. 5, 2019, 8:10 PM),
https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/breaking/ct-met-chicago-police-reform-communityoversight-20190305-story.html [https://perma.cc/R9R3-S2E8].
106 Id.
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Prior versions of the ordinance were controversial because they would
have given the entity the power to set Police Department policy and the
power to fire the police superintendent.107
3.

Dallas, Texas

Community concerns about the effectiveness of the Dallas Citizens
Police Review Board are well-documented.108 In 2017, U.S.
Representative Eddie Bernice Johnson commissioned a report that
outlined reforms for the agency.109 However, the need for reform did not
get much political traction until 2019, when a twenty-six-year-old man
was shot and killed inside his own apartment by an off-duty police
officer.110 In December 2018, local community members complained that
the Dallas Civilian Police Review Board had been “unable to provide
meaningful oversight” over the Dallas Police Department and
recommended that an entirely new oversight structure be implemented.111
In April 2019, the Dallas City Council considered a proposal for
reform that included renaming the Review Board the “Community Police
Oversight Board” and creating a new three-person city department to be
called the Office of Police Oversight (OPO).112 According to the
proposal, the OPO would receive complaints and mediate disputes
between complainants and the police department.113 OPO would also
have the power to independently investigate and monitor police
department internal investigations.114 Some community activists
expressed concern about the level of involvement that the police union
had been afforded in drafting the revisions to the oversight system.115

Id.
See Peter Simek, Proposal to Increase Community Oversight of Dallas Police Department
Heads to City Council, D MAG. (Apr. 2, 2019, 11:33 AM), https://www.dmagazine.com/
frontburner/2019/04/proposal-to-increase-community-oversight-of-dallas-police-departmentheads-to-city-council [https://perma.cc/YT2D-CFA5].
109 Id.
110 Id.
111 Dall. Cmty. Police Oversight Coal., The Dallas Community Police Oversight Board: A New
Model To Improve Accountability and Public Trust, Presentation to the Dallas Citizen’s Police
Review Board (Dec. 11, 2018), https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/5634441/
20181217182736243.pdf [https://perma.cc/YWK2-3YU9].
112 U. Renee Hall, Chief of Police, Dall. Police Dep’t, Proposed Recommendations and
Amendments to the Citizens Police Review Board, Dallas City Council Briefing 5 (Apr. 3, 2019),
https://dallascityhall.com/government/Council%20Meeting%20Documents/proposedrecommendations-and-amendments-to-the-citizens-police-review-board_combined_040319.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2HFK-XC6L].
113 Id. at 6.
114 Id. at 6–7.
115 Dall. Cmty. Police Oversight Coal., supra note 111, at 3.
107
108
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Despite this, the Dallas City Council voted unanimously to enact the
reforms and gave the newly renamed Community Police Oversight Board
a budget and staff of four to monitor complaints against police officers.116
4.

Seattle, Washington

In 2017, the City passed historic legislation creating a new multifaceted accountability structure, including enhancing the existing Office
of Police Accountability, making the Community Police Commission a
permanent fixture, and creating the role of Inspector General for Public
Safety.117 In so doing, the legislators explicitly acknowledged the benefit
of having a multi-tiered oversight system in the ordinance, stating:
“Having a collaborative relationship between all police oversight entities,
with specific roles and responsibilities for each, strengthens police
accountability in a manner that is not possible for each entity alone.”118
The establishing ordinance delineated the responsibilities of the new
oversight triumvirate. The Office of Police Accountability (OPA)
“help[s] ensure the actions of SPD [Seattle Police Department]
employees are constitutional and in compliance with federal, state, local
laws, and with City and SPD policies, and to promote respectful and
effective policing”; the Office of Inspector General for Public Safety
(OIG) “help[s] ensure the fairness and integrity of the police system as a
whole in its delivery of law enforcement services by providing civilian
auditing of the management, practices, and policies of SPD and OPA,”
and also oversees compliance with the City’s federal consent decree; and
the Community Police Commission (CPC) “help[s] ensure public
confidence in the effectiveness and professionalism of SPD and the
responsiveness of the police accountability system to public concerns.”119
5.

Oakland, California

In 2018, Oakland disbanded the Citizens Police Review Board after
amending the City Charter to create a new Police Commission and
establish a new investigative agency, the Community Police Review
Agency.120 The new Police Commission oversees the Oakland Police
116 Dallas Expands Powers of Police Oversight Board, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Apr. 24, 2019,
https://apnews.com/0af3a0b3f6b74f78806535d09e815e1d [https://perma.cc/G93J-TWEZ].
117 See Steve Miletich, Seattle City Council Passes Historic Police-Accountability Legislation,
SEATTLE TIMES (May 22, 2017), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/crime/seattle-citycouncil-passes-historic-police-accountability-legislation [https://perma.cc/3X3Z-QE4C].
118 Seattle, Wash., Ordinance 125315 § 1(N) (June 1, 2017).
119 Id. § 3.29.010(B).
120 OAKLAND, CAL., CODE § 2.45.020 (2019)).
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Department by reviewing and proposing changes to its policies and
procedures.121 The Police Commission can also terminate the Chief of
Police for cause without the mayor’s approval.122 The new Community
Police Review Agency can investigate complaints involving use of force,
in-custody deaths, profiling, and public assemblies. Under the new
regime, the Police Commission can also direct the Review Agency to
look into other possible incidents of police misconduct.123 The Review
Agency must submit its findings and proposed discipline to the Police
Commission and the Chief of Police.124 Differences of opinion between
the Review Agency and the Chief of Police are reviewed and resolved by
a three-person panel comprised of members of the Police Commission.125
To ensure sufficient manpower, the City Charter requires the Review
Agency to employ at least one investigator for every one hundred sworn
officers of the Police Department.126
In addition to establishing the Police Commission and revamping
the Review Agency, a city ordinance also created the Office of Inspector
General to provide the Audit function external to the police
department.127 After the new Police Commission has operated for one
year, the police department’s internal inspector general function will be
renamed, and the Inspector General will report directly to the Police
Commission.128
6.

Albuquerque, New Mexico

In 1996, the Albuquerque City Council initiated a process to review
its police oversight system and abolished the then-existing Public Safety
Advisory Board, replacing it with the Police Oversight Commission.129
In 2013, the City Council established the Ad Hoc Police Oversight Task
Force to again re-evaluate the police oversight structure.130 In 2014, the
U.S. Department of Justice concluded that Albuquerque’s oversight
system had contributed to systemic problems regarding use-of-force
encounters.131 To address these issues and concerns, the City Council in

121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131

OAKLAND, CAL., CHARTER § 604; OAKLAND, CAL., CODE § 2.45.070.
OAKLAND, CAL., CODE § 2.45.070(E).
OAKLAND, CAL., CHARTER § 604(f)(1); OAKLAND, CAL., CODE § 2.46.030; .
OAKLAND, CAL., CHARTER § 604(f)(3).
Id. § 604(g)(2).
Id. § 604(e)(4).
OAKLAND, CAL., CODE § 2.45.100.
Id.
ALBUQUERQUE, N.M., CODE § 9-4-1-3(B) (2019).
Id. § 9-4-1-3(C).
Id. § 9-4-1-3(D).
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2014 enacted an ordinance that created a new oversight system.132 This
new system is comprised of the Civilian Police Oversight Agency, an
Investigative agency, and the Police Oversight Board, which reviews the
latter’s findings and makes disciplinary recommendations.133
D.

Jurisdictions that Have Recently Enhanced the Powers of Existing
Oversight Entities

In the past five years, some jurisdictions have implemented more
modest reforms for enhancing the scope or powers of existing oversight
entities. A few examples of these follow.
1.

Atlanta, Georgia

In 2016, the Atlanta City Council revised the ordinance governing
its Citizen Review Board by expanding the types of cases the agency
could review and allowing citizens to make anonymous complaints to the
Board.134
2.

Boston, Massachusetts

In 2017, the Community Ombudsman Oversight Panel created a
new, neutral location for the public to file complaints and increased the
number of cases it would review from ten percent to twenty percent.135
Additionally, any case involving allegations of discrimination or use of
force resulting in serious injury is now automatically referred to the
Oversight Panel for review.136
3.

Denver, Colorado

In 2015, the Denver City Council approved an ordinance requiring
local police agencies to work with the Office of the Independent Monitor

Albuquerque, N.M., Ordinance O-2016-013 (June 22, 2016).
Id.
134 Dan Klepal, Powers of Atlanta Citizen Review Board Expanded, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Mar.
21, 2016), https://www.ajc.com/news/local-govt--politics/powers-atlanta-citizen-review-boardexpanded/a13gYGbnuUkUER0xfKw6II [https://perma.cc/WWF8-ZKN8].
135 Police Oversight and Public Complaint Programs Expanded, BOSTON.GOV (June 7, 2017),
https://www.boston.gov/news/police-oversight-and-public-complaint-programs-expanded [https://
perma.cc/KW7N-DFN8].
136 Id.
132
133
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during internal investigations and disciplinary proceedings.137
Additionally, in 2016, the Council entertained a measure that would add
the civilian police oversight agency to the City’s charter, thereby making
it more difficult for city officials to alter or eliminate the agency’s
powers.138
In 2019, city officials further revised the agency’s mandate. For
example, the agency was given jurisdiction to investigate the Chief of
Police and Sheriff.139 The ordinance also banned retaliating against
people who report concerns to the Monitor and requires law enforcement
to respond in writing to the entity’s policy recommendations.140 The
agency is also authorized to publish policy papers and in-depth
investigations.141
4.

Houston, Texas

Civilian oversight has been an issue of controversy in Houston for
decades. The Houston City Council, voting along racial lines, decided
against the establishment of a civilian review board in 1989. 142 In 2016,
the Houston Independent Police Oversight Board came under attack by
community activists as well as some of its own members who claimed
the Board had not performed effective oversight in the five years since it
was created.143 During that time, there had been 150 officer-involved
shootings with no officer being found at fault.144
The twenty-one-member board, which had no paid staff and lacked
subpoena power, could provide only limited oversight because its
jurisdiction was limited only to matters that were referred to it by the

137 Adam McCoy, City Moves to Protect Police Oversight Agency, COLO. POLITICS (Aug. 11,
2016),
https://www.coloradopolitics.com/news/city-moves-to-protect-police-oversight-agency/
article_bca363fb-da2c-5f97-9746-15b8ed9759a9.html [https://perma.cc/G43F-DRPX].
138 Id.
139 Elise Schmelzer & Andrew Kenney, Denver City Council to Consider Closing Loophole
Excusing Police Chief, Sheriff from Investigation by City’s Independent Watchdog, DENVER POST
(Jan. 10, 2019, 11:59 AM), https://www.denverpost.com/2019/01/10/denver-office-independentmonitor-police-chief-sheriff [https://perma.cc/SX9D-HQFN].
140 David Sachs, Denver’s Police Watchdog Just Got Sharper Teeth, DENVERITE (Feb. 19, 2019,
7:44 PM), https://denverite.com/2019/02/19/denvers-police-watchdog-just-got-sharper-teeth
[https://perma.cc/AQ78-7VJR].
141 Id.
142 Iris, supra note 9, at 220.
143 James Pinkerton, Houston’s Police Oversight Group Called a ‘Toothless Watchdog’, HOUS.
CHRON. (Sept. 17, 2016, 9:23 PM), https://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/houstontexas/houston/article/Houston-s-police-oversight-group-called-a-9229728.php [https://perma.cc/
4MKE-2UYS].
144 Id.
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police department.145 One of the Board members, a former federal
prosecutor, publicly called for enhancing the Board’s powers to enable it
to conduct truly independent police-misconduct investigations and to
make policy recommendations.146 In June 2018, the mayor issued an
executive order delineating new powers for the Board,147 including the
power to review any internal investigation of possible misconduct by
Houston Police Department employees involving the use of force, the
discharge of firearms, and serious bodily injury or death.148
5.

San Antonio, Texas

In response to recommendations made by the Police Executive
Research Forum,149 San Antonio changed the composition of its Citizen
Advisory Action Board.150 The Board is now comprised of seven
appointees, selected from a panel of fourteen community members.151
Pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement between the City and the
police union, seven uniformed employees will also serve on the Board.152
The citizen membership of the Board will periodically be rotated.153
6.

San Francisco, California

In 1982, San Francisco amended its city charter to create the Office
of Citizen Complaints as a city department under the Police
Commission’s direct supervision.154 The agency was tasked with
investigating police misconduct complaints, regularly reporting on the
complaints, and making recommendations “concerning policies or
practices of the department which could be changed or amended to avoid
unnecessary tension with the public or a definable segment of the public

Id.
Id.
147 Hous. Exec. Order No. 1-5 Revised (June 25, 2018).
148 Id. § 5.1.
149 The Police Executive Research Forum is a non-profit organization founded in 1976 that
conducts research related to policing policy and provides management and technical assistance to
law enforcement agencies. POLICE EXEC. RES. FORUM, https://www.policeforum.org [https://
perma.cc/5SLV-U79N].
150 Citizen Advisory Action Board, CITY OF SAN ANTONIO, https://webapp9.sanantonio.gov/
boardcommapplication/PrintAgenda?id=Citizen%20Advisory%20Action%20Board
[https://
perma.cc/9BUR-DYA2].
151 Id.
152 Id.
153 Id.
154 S.F., CAL., CHARTER § 4.127 (2015).
145
146

30

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW DE NOVO

[2020

while insuring effective police services.”155 In 2016, a city ordinance
renamed the entity the Department of Police Accountability and
empowered it with its own budget and the ability to biannually audit the
San Francisco Police Department’s handling of complaints and use-offorce incidents.156
7.

St. Paul, Minnesota

A 2016 ordinance changed the makeup of the City’s Police Civilian
Internal Affairs Review Commission and provided it with additional
powers.157 The size of the Commission was increased from seven voting
members to nine.158 Additionally, the ordinance eliminated the
requirement that two Commission members be members of the St. Paul
Police Federation. Under a new appointment scheme, the City’s Director
of the Department of Human Rights and Equal Economic Opportunity
will recommend candidates for appointment by the mayor.159 The
ordinance also expanded the scope of the Commission’s review powers
beyond complaints of excessive force and inappropriate use of firearms
to include complaints of racial profiling and other complaints that the
Director of the Department of Human Rights and Equal Economic
Opportunity refers to the Board.160
IV. LONGEVITY OF CIVILIAN OVERSIGHT ENTITIES
Sustainability continues to be a challenge for civilian oversight
entities. Nonetheless, the survey found that out of the eighty-eight
oversight entities currently operating in the one hundred most populous
U.S. cities, thirty-nine entities are at least twenty years old.161 The five
longest-standing entities are police commissions which were established
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

Id.
About Us, DEP’T OF POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY, CITY & CTY. OF S.F., https://sfgov.org/dpa
[https://perma.cc/ASX2-8WBC].
157 St. Paul, Minn., Ordinance 16-49 (Dec. 14, 2016) (codified at ST. PAUL, MINN., CODE ch.
102 (2019)).
158 ST. PAUL, MINN., CODE § 102.02(a).
159 Id. § 102.02(b).
160 Id. § 102.01(b).
161 See infra Appendix B for a list of thirty-nine civilian oversight entities that have existed for
twenty years or more.
155
156
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At that time, many state legislatures created police commissions as
a “means of wresting control” over local police departments from
opposing city-based political networks.162 However, other forms of
civilian oversight began cropping up in the latter half of the twentieth
century. Numerous entities have been operating since the 1970s and
1980s.163 There was also a proliferation of entities in the 1990s.
Among those entities that are at least twenty years old, those that
provide Supervisory oversight (typically a police commission) tend to be
the longest running, yet more entities perform the Review and
Investigative functions.

162 See Samuel Walker, Governing the American Police: Wrestling with the Problems of
Democracy, 2016 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 615, 637 (2016) (“The nineteenth century police commissions
were generally created by state legislatures as a means of wresting control of a police department
from city political machines, which were controlled by the legislature’s rival political party. . . .
The most notable police commissions that exist today include the Kansas City, Missouri, Police
Commission; the Milwaukee Fire and Police Commission, created in 1885; the Los Angeles Police
Commission; the San Francisco Police Commission; and the Detroit Board of Police
Commissioners, which was created in 1973.”).
163 See infra app. B.
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Despite their longevity, the effectiveness and transparency of
civilian oversight entities across the country, including some of the
longest-standing organizations, continually draw criticism, which results
in ongoing debate. As one commentator has noted, “[t]he fortunes of
civilian review bodies have waxed and waned as political support and
opposition shifted ground and policing scandals broke and subsided.”164
In May 2019, the Cleveland Council Safety Committee held a
hearing on whether that city’s civilian oversight entities, the Office of
Professional Standards, established in 2008, and the Civilian Police
Review Board, established in 1984, have successfully provided effective
oversight.165 The local news media claimed to have uncovered efficiency
and transparency problems with the decades-old Civilian Police Review
Board166 and that, in 2018, the Cleveland Police Chief went against the
Review Board’s recommended discipline in more than one-third of
cases.167
Even one of the longest-running civilian oversight entities in the
United States, New York’s Civilian Complaint Review Board, continues
to spark criticism. The New York Civil Liberties Union (NYCLU)
recently claimed the agency has failed to fulfill its mission because it has
not established an effective investigative operation.168 The NYCLU also
claimed the agency has failed to effectively advocate for reforms of
police practices that pose a risk to public safety.169
Prenzler, supra note 5, at 8.
City Officials Hold Hearing About Department that Investigates Citizen Complaints Against
Police, ABC NEWS 5 CLEVELAND (May 8, 2019, 9:57 AM), https://www.news5cleveland.com/
news/local-news/city-officials-hold-hearing-about-department-that-investigates-citizencomplaints-against-police [https://perma.cc/E9NF-JVBE].
166 In December 2014, a local television news channel’s investigation uncovered that the
Civilian Police Review Board had ruled on only 36 of 441 cases of alleged police misconduct
reported by citizens in 2014. Kristin Volk, No Progress with Civilian Police Review Board, ABC
NEWS 5 CLEVELAND (Apr. 19, 2016, 8:20 PM), https://www.news5cleveland.com/news/localnews/cleveland-metro/civilian-police-review-board-website-shows-no-transparency-or-progress15-years-later [https://perma.cc/49HP-V8VG]. The same problem existed as of September 2015,
when further investigations revealed that the Board had only ruled on 46 out of 474 complaints
lodged in 2014. Id. By that time, Cleveland was working on reforms pursuant to a consent decree
with the DOJ, which included several provisions related to the police accountability system. See
generally Settlement Agreement, United States v. City of Cleveland, No. 1:15-cv-01046-SO(N.D.
Ohio June 12, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/crt/case-document/file/908536/download [https://
perma.cc/E522-DBZ5].
167 Jordan Vandenberge, Report: CPD Chief Went Against Civilian Review Board’s
Recommendations 35% of the Time in 2018, ABC NEWS 5 CLEVELAND (May 8, 2019, 5:30 PM),
https://www.news5cleveland.com/news/local-news/cleveland-metro/report-police-chief-wentagainst-civilian-review-boards-recommendations-35-of-the-time-in-2018 [https://perma.cc/59N5TS6W].
168 Mission Failure: Civilian Review of Policing in New York City, 1994–2006, N.Y. CIVIL
LIBERTIES UNION, https://www.nyclu.org/en/mission-failure-civilian-review-policing-new-yorkcity-summary-findings [https://perma.cc/6NEM-B3K2].
169 Id.
164
165
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In April 2018, the New York Police Department and the Civilian
Complaint Review Board were at odds over disciplinary
recommendations.170 Upset about an agency rule change, the Police
Commissioner started rejecting more of the Board’s disciplinary
recommendations.171
V. KEY IMPEDIMENTS TO EFFECTIVE CIVILIAN OVERSIGHT
A.

Lack of Independence

Independence is broadly recognized as both a core principle and an
essential element of effective civilian oversight.172 Without
independence, accountability systems often fail to meet community
expectations, leading to a repetitive cycle of “crisis, debate, attempt at
reform”.173 Accordingly, independence has emerged as a core value for
many of the entities formed in recent years.174 Many local governments
have explicitly identified independence as a key objective when devising
the structure and powers of their oversight entities.175 Several
components of independence can profoundly affect an oversight entity’s
ability to hold officers accountable, and certain powers and capabilities

170 Benjamin Mueller, Police, at Odds with Oversight Board, Reject More of Its Penalties, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 12, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/12/nyregion/police-at-odds-withoversight-board-reject-more-of-its-penalties.html [https://perma.cc/AP69-B7RC].
171 Id.
172 Prenzler, supra note 5, at 24.
173 For a dissucssion of this cyclical evolution, see infra Section V.E; see also Prenzler, supra
note 5, at 8 (“The failure to deliver on this most basic requirement [independence] means that
systems remain broken and calls for reform continue.”).
174 For example, a report issued by the working group established to make recommendations
regarding civilian oversight for the city of Austin, Texas, recognized that independence not only
from the police department, but also from city managers was an important objective for the new
oversight structure. AUSTIN OVERSIGHT RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 8, at 13 (“Several
members of the Working Group have expressed a strong desire that the oversight agency operate
independent of the City of Austin. The extent to which oversight is independent of police, political
actors and other special interests have been argued to be strongly related to the effectiveness of
oversight.”).
175 See, e.g., ST. LOUIS, MO., REV. CODE ch. 3.140 (2019)) (stating that “community policing,
citizen cooperation, and citizen participation are vital . . . to law enforcement, and can be enhanced
by an independent citizen oversight process”); ALBUQUERQUE, N.M., CODE § 9-4-1-2(B) (2019)
(stating that the purpose of the measure is to “[e]nsure that the civilian police oversight body
functions as independently as possible from the executive and legislative branches of
government”); see also Omaha, Neb., Exec. Order No. S-30-15 Amended (Aug. 10, 2016) (stating
the purpose is to augment the investigations of citizen complaints against sworn officers “by
providing for an independent review”).
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are essential to independence: subpoena power,176 access to law
enforcement information and internal department documents and
evidentiary material,177 and financial resources.178
Subpoena power, in particular, has emerged as a major source of
debate.179 Those who oppose it claim that providing civilian oversight
agencies with subpoena power will undermine or interfere with
department investigations or potential criminal prosecutions.180 Yet, the
power to compel both law enforcement and civilian witnesses to provide
information is essential to the investigatory process and is also relevant
to the Review and Appeals forms of oversight.181
Another aspect of independence that can profoundly affect an
entity’s effectiveness and credibility is budgetary independence. Lack of
resources can undermine the thoroughness and timeliness of
investigations. When agencies accumulate significant case backlogs,
complainants and officers alike become frustrated. Many of the recently
created entities have addressed this by explicitly funding oversight
separate from the police department.182
176 See, e.g., Reenah L. Kim, Legitimizing Community Consent to Local Policing: The Need for
Democratically Negotiated Community Representation on Civilian Advisory Councils, 36 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 461, 501–02 & n.181 (2001) (recognizing the importance of subpoena power
for effective civilian oversight); King, supra note 20, at 108–10 (same); Ken Takahashi, The
Release-Dismissal Agreement: An Imperfect Instrument of Dispute Resolution, 72 WASH. U. L.Q.
1769, 1796–97 (1994) (same).
177 See, e.g., Udi Ofer, Getting It Right: Building Effective Civilian Review Boards to Oversee
Police, 46 SETON HALL L. REV. 1033, 1046 (2016) (recognizing the importance of access to
internal police documents, disciplinary records, medical records, surveillance footage, and other
materials relevant to a police misconduct investigation).
178 A 2016 report issued by Chicago’s Police Accountability Task Force noted lack of resources
as one of the barriers to effectiveness plaguing the Independent Police Review Authority, which
was the civilian investigative agency in place at the time of the Laquan McDonald shooting. CHI.
POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY TASK FORCE, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORM: RESTORING TRUST
BETWEEN THE CHICAGO POLICE AND THE COMMUNITIES THEY SERVE 77(2016) https://
chicagopatf.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/PATF_Final_Report_4_13_16-1.pdf
[https://
perma.cc/7R6Y-ALUA]. When the Chicago City Council created the new oversight agency, the
Civilian Office of Police Accountability, it included a budget floor in the establishing ordinance
which set a minimum for the civilian investigative agency’s budget relative to the annual
appropriation for the Chicago Police Department. See CHI., ILL., CODE § 2-78-105 (2019).
179 See discussion infra Section V.D.
180 King, supra note 20, at 110.
181 Id. at 108–09; see also Nathan Witkin, The Police-Community Partnership: Civilian
Oversight as an Evaluation Tool for Community Policing, 18 SCHOLAR 181, 215 (2016) (noting
that subpoena power is a way to overcome both apathy and resistance on the part of witnesses).
182 See, e.g., ST. LOUIS, MO., REV. CODE § 3.140.050(2) (2019) (noting that the Civilian
Oversight Board’s budget resides within the city’s appropriation for the Department of Public
Safety); ALBUQUERQUE, N.M., CODE § 9-4-1-4(A)(2) (2019) (“The CPOA [Civilian Police
Oversight Agency] shall have a dedicated and independent source of funding . . . [and shall]
administer its own budget . . . .”); DALL., TEX., CODE § 37-38 (2019) (explicitly stating that
funding for the city’s oversight entities is to be provided by the city outside of the police
department’s budget).
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Some jurisdictions have emphasized the importance of budgetary
independence by establishing a budgetary floor relative to the police
department’s budget. For example, by ordinance, the budget for
Albuquerque’s Civilian Police Oversight Agency must be at least onehalf of one percent of the Albuquerque Police Department’s budget.183 In
Chicago, the budget floor for the Civilian Office of Police Accountability
is one percent of the Chicago Police Department’s budget.184
Another strategy to enhance independence that has recently gained
more traction among civilian oversight entities is the power to engage
independent legal counsel. The legal issues that arise in the context of
police disciplinary matters can be quite complex because the underlying
legal framework lies at the intersection of constitutional law, state
statutes, municipal codes, collective bargaining agreements, and
department- and city-wide rules and policies. Thus, oversight
professionals may require the assistance of legal professionals in the
performance of their duties. Because most oversight entities are arms of
municipal government, they may be prohibited by law from using legal
representation other than the designated attorney for the city. In Chicago,
attorneys in the office of the City’s Corporation Counsel represent all city
agencies, including the police department and the oversight agencies, in
all legal proceedings.185 As such, attorneys within the Corporation
Counsel’s office defend the City and its police officers in suits alleging
police misconduct. When attorneys within this same office are also tasked
with advising the police oversight entities, these dual responsibilities may
come into direct conflict.186 This issue was a major bone of contention
when city leaders were drafting the powers and responsibilities of
Chicago’s Civilian Office of Police Accountability.187 Ultimately, the
City Council overruled the Law Department’s objection, and the new

ALBUQUERQUE, N.M., CODE § 9-4-1-4(A)(2).
CHI., ILL, CODE § 2-78-105 (2019).
185 Ferguson v. Patton, 985 N.E. 2d 1000, 1010 (Ill. 2013) (“Section 21-11 of the Illinois
Municipal Code expressly provides that the corporation counsel ‘shall appear for and protect the
rights and interests of the city in all actions, suits, and proceedings brought by or against it or any
city officer, board or department.’”).
186 See William Josephson & Russell Pearce, To Whom Does the Government Lawyer Owe the
Duty of Loyalty When Clients Are in Conflict, 29 HOW. L.J. 539, 540 (1986) (recognizing that an
ethical conflict exists when a government lawyer represents two agencies that “are on opposite
sides of a legal argument”).
187 Fran Spielman, Civilian Office on Police Accountability to Replace IPRA, CHI. SUN-TIMES
(Aug. 29, 2016, 6:03 PM), https://chicago.suntimes.com/2016/8/29/18335727/civilian-office-onpolice-accountability-to-replace-ipra [https://perma.cc/WCX3-4L9M] (discussing that an initial
draft of the establishing ordinance did not provide the investigative agency with the power to
engage outside counsel because the city’s law department was against giving the agency that
power).
183
184
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agency was given the power to hire outside counsel, with some
restrictions on the selection process.188
Because there may be complex cases in which oversight decisionmakers could benefit from unconflicted legal advice, many of the recently
established oversight entities have the power to engage outside
counsel.189 The Austin Police Oversight Advisory Working Group
recognized this conflict in the issues and recommendations they
identified to be addressed by the design of that city’s oversight system.190
B.

Legal Impediments to Transparency

Transparency has been and continues to be a challenge for civilian
oversight entities. Transparency is important within the context of police
accountability because it reflects the extent to which those affected by
police misconduct, and the community at large, are able to learn the
relevant facts, as well as the mechanism and process by which an incident
was assessed.191
For example, Houston’s Independent Police Oversight Board has
been criticized for its lack of transparency.192 The Board cannot publicly
announce its findings, so citizens have no way of knowing whether the
Board ever disagreed with the police department in a disciplinary
matter.193
In October 2018, Baltimore’s Civilian Review Board was in the
thick of a dispute with the Baltimore Police Department regarding
transparency issues. According to a Letter to the Editor written by a
Board member and published in the Baltimore Sun, the City
188 CHI., ILL., CODE § 2-78-120(q) (stating that COPA has the power to “retain counsel to
enforce and defend against subpoenas and to advise and represent the Office [COPA] with respect
to its investigations,” but restricting the selection of outside counsel to a set of “five firms
previously approved by the Corporation Counsel after consultation with the Office”).
189 See, e.g., OAKLAND, CAL., CODE § 2.45.180(D) (2019) (outlining provisions for a non-City
attorney legal advisor to provide advice and counsel to the Oakland Police Commission and
Community Police Review Agency); CHI., ILL., CODE § 2-78-120(q) (giving the Civilian Office of
Police Accountability the power to engage outside counsel with some restrictions on the selection
process); ALBUQUERQUE, N.M., CODE § 9-4-1-4(A)(3) (2019) (giving the Albuquerque Civilian
Police Oversight Agency the power to retain or employ independent legal counsel on a contractual
basis to advise and represent the agency).
190 AUSTIN OVERSIGHT RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 8, at 8 (listing the “[p]otential conflict
of interest with City of Austin Law Department that represents both the Austin Police Department
and the OPM [Office of the Police Monitor]” as among the “Identified Issues” guiding
recommendations for police oversight).
191 See, e.g., RICHARD E. OLIVER, WHAT IS TRANSPARENCY? 5 (2004) (defining “transparency”
as “a principle that allows those affected by administrative decisions . . . to know not only the basic
facts and figures but the mechanisms and processes”).
192 Pinkerton, supra note 143.
193 Id.
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Administrator had asked the Board to sign a confidentiality agreement
that would significantly restrict the Board’s ability to share information
concerning its actions with the public.194 The Board refused to sign the
agreement, promising to continue to abide by its statutory confidentiality
obligations.195 In response, the police department stopped providing case
files, thereby undermining the Board’s ability to investigate
allegations.196 The police department also refused to comply with the
Board’s subpoenas.197 Ultimately, the City backed off on its request for
confidentiality, ending the stalemate between the agency and the police
department.198
The Oklahoma City Police Citizen’s Advisory Board has also been
widely criticized for its lack of transparency.199 The eleven-member
Board, which was created in 2005 in the wake of a 2002 police-brutality
incident, was established to foster greater engagement between the police
department and the community.200 Yet, all of the Board’s oversight
activities take place out of public view.201 The Board meets behind closed
doors, no agenda is publicized, minutes and reports are unpublished, and
members are not permitted to talk about their work.202
It is important to note, however, that the extent to which oversight
agencies report on their processes and findings is often constrained by
local and state law.203 An oversight agency’s reporting may be explicitly
194 Bridal Pearson, Civilian Review Board: Baltimore Police Undermining Oversight Efforts,
BALT. SUN (Oct. 18, 2018, 10:55 AM), https://www.baltimoresun.com/opinion/op-ed/bs-ed-op1019-20181018-story.html [https://perma.cc/Z28B-USW4].
195 Id.
196 Id.
197 Id.
198 Jessica Anderson, Baltimore Police Civilian Review Board No Longer Required to Sign
Confidentiality Deals, City Solicitor Says, BALT. SUN (Nov. 19, 2018), https://
www.baltimoresun.com/news/crime/bs-md-ci-crb-resolution-20181119-story.html
[https://
perma.cc/2J3Y-D94S].
199 Juliana Keeping, Oklahoma City Police’s Citizens Advisory Board Treads Line Between
Accountability, Secrecy, OKLAHOMAN (Mar. 30, 2015, 12:00 AM), https://oklahoman.com/article/
5405432/oklahoma-city-polices-citizens-advisory-board-treads-line-between-accountabilitysecrecy [https://perma.cc/HNH4-DT9B].
200 Id.
201 Id.
202 Id. According to the entity’s website, members are may not “[r]elease any written or oral
report of any board activity to any individual or body other than to the Chief of Police or the Office
of the city Manager.” Citizens Advisory Board, OKLA. CITY POLICE DEP’T, https://www.okc.gov/
departments/police/about-us/citizens-advisory-board [https://perma.cc/T86E-H8LV].
203 See, e.g., ST. LOUIS, MO., REV. CODE § 3.140.080(3) (June 6, 2015) (“The COB [Civilian
Oversight Board] shall hold closed meetings in compliance with State law (including § 610.021,
RSMo.), in any matter that includes the reviewing and investigating of a complaint regarding
personnel, personnel records, or any other records protected from disclosure by law.”); Omaha,
Neb., Exec. Order No. S-30-15 Amended § IV (Aug. 10, 2016) (“Due to the provisions of the City
Charter governing advisory committees to the Mayor, Section 23-25 of the Omaha Municipal Code,
state and federal constitutional protections, as well as the Collective Bargaining Agreement
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limited by its establishing ordinance, relevant collective bargaining
agreements, or other municipal law.204 Additionally, although some states
allow for greater transparency, many have statutes restricting public
disclosure of police-disciplinary matters.205
Many jurisdictions are trying to more proactively address
transparency by building into their oversight systems mechanisms geared
toward making as much information publicly available as is legally
permissible.206 For example, in response to the controversy surrounding
the release of the video of the officer-involved shooting of Laquan
McDonald, Chicago implemented a new policy requiring the release of
information and video materials relating to serious police incidents.207
Pursuant to this policy, the civilian investigative agency (COPA) releases
the following material within sixty days of an incident covered by the
policy:
▪

All video and audio recordings relating to the incident,
including tapes of 911 calls;

▪

Office of Emergency Management & Communication
(OEMC) dispatch recordings;

between the City and the Police Union, the proceedings of the CCRB [Citizen Complaint Review
Board] are considered confidential and shall not be open to the public and/or media.”).
204 See, e.g., Omaha, Neb., Exec. Order No. S-30-15 Amended § IV.
205 The State of California recently passed legislation allowing for greater disclosure of police
disciplinary records, see S.B. 1421, 2017–2018 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2017) (codified at CAL. PENAL
CODE § 832.7 (West 2019)), whereas several other states continue to restrict disclosure of such
records, see Kristine Cordier Karnezis, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of
Statutory Provisions Relating to Public Access to Police Records, 82 A.L.R.3d 19 (1978)
(discussing the various statutory provisions relating to public access to police records). For
example, a Texas statute prohibits the disclosure of disciplinary information maintained in police
department personnel files. TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 143.089(g) (West 2019) (“A fire or
police department may maintain a personnel file on a fire fighter or police officer employed by the
department for the department’s use, but the department may not release any information contained
in the department file to any agency or person requesting information relating to a fire fighter or
police officer.”).
206 For example, the new system in Austin, Texas, will allow the oversight entity to make its
records, including policy recommendations and case summaries, publicly available online. Mark
D. Wilson, Policing the Police: Austin Police Oversight Office Flexes New Muscles, AUSTIN AM.STATESMAN (Jan. 30, 2019, 11:08 AM), https://www.statesman.com/news/20190130/policingpolice-austin-police-oversight-office-flexes-new-muscles [https://perma.cc/VYR8-4M2G]. The
issue of transparency was sufficiently important to be mentioned in the ordinance establishing
Tampa’s Citizens Review Board. TAMPA, FLA., CODE § 18-8(b) (2019) (“The purpose of the CRB
is to foster transparency, enhance communication and ensure a relationship of trust and respect
between the Tampa Police Department (“Department”) and the community . . . .”). Additionally,
by ordinance, the Newark Civilian Complaint Review Board must hold public meetings at least
every other month. NEWARK, N.J., REV. GEN. ORDINANCES § 2:2-86.5 (2019).
207 Chi., Ill., Civilian Office of Police Accountability Rules and Regulations § 6.1.1 (2018),
http://www.chicagocopa.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Final-COPA-Rules-and-RegulationsApril-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/XBA4-NVY8] (outlining COPA’s Video Release Policy).
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▪

Chicago Police Department (CPD) radio calls;

▪

Video and audio from CPD dash or body cameras;

▪

Videos from CPD or OEMC Police Observation Devices
(POD) (e.g., cameras);

▪

Any video or audio recordings made using cameras or
equipment not owned or controlled by the City that come into
the possession or control of CPD or COPA; and

▪

Any arrest reports, original case incident reports, tactical
response reports (TRRs), and officer’s battery reports
(OBRs).208

C.

39

Lack of Actual or Perceived Neutrality

The extent to which oversight entities continue to operate with a law
enforcement–like culture continues to be the subject of debate.209 An
important but somewhat subtle challenge facing civilian oversight
entities is the “civilianness” of an entity’s culture.210 Every oversight
entity operates according to a set of customs and norms, which contribute
to an entity-wide culture. The term “civilianness” is used to describe the
extent to which an entity embodies a law-enforcement ethos.211 The range
of cultures observable in oversight entities across jurisdictions
nationwide likely reflects a continuum of “civilianness” depending on the
extent to which the entity embraces law enforcement–like methods and
cultural norms.

The issue of civilianness often arises within the context of agency
staffing; specifically, whether or not civilian entities should be populated

Id.
See Stephen P. Savage, Seeking ‘Civilianness’: Police Complaints and the Civilian Control
Model of Oversight, 53 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 886, 902 (2013) (“[T]here seem to be remnants of
police-related cultural forms which have been reconstituted within the environment of oversight
bodies.”).
210 Id. at 886 (describing “civilianness” in the context of the military as the degree to which a
civil entity is “distinct from the military”).
211 Id. at 886–87 (noting that the cultural profile of a civilian oversight entity is defined by the
extent to which it lacks a law enforcement ethos).
208
209
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with individuals who have prior law enforcement experience.212
Although this issue is perhaps most relevant to the Investigative form of
oversight, it is also a consideration when populating boards that provide
other functions.213 Many jurisdictions value prior law enforcement
experience as relevant and helpful within the context of police oversight
and thus hire or permit the appointment of former law enforcement
officers.214 However, the potential issue with hiring previously sworn
officers is that they often import attitudes and methods that could
undermine the neutrality, or the perception of neutrality, of the civilian
oversight process while also destabilizing the balance of civilianness of
an entity’s culture.215
The extent to which oversight entities should be populated with
previously sworn officers was the subject of great debate in Chicago
when city and community leaders were negotiating the details of the
Civilian Office of Police Accountability. Community members were
concerned that allowing the new agency to hire investigators who had
previously worked as sworn law enforcement officers would lead to
investigative outcomes biased toward accused officers. However, city
leaders were concerned that a complete prohibition against hiring
professionals who had served as sworn officers would severely limit the
agency’s ability to hire investigators with relevant experience, thereby
undermining the potential expertise and professionalism of its
investigative staff. Although there are many experienced investigators
who have acquired expertise in the private sector or in unsworn
government roles, the most directly relevant investigative experience for
civilian oversight of law enforcement is prior work in law enforcement.
A compromise was ultimately reached, and the Chicago ordinance
outlined that only investigators who had served as a sworn officer within
the Chicago Police Department in the preceding five years would be
prohibited from employment with the oversight agency.216

212 Id. at 887 (“The issue of former police officers working within civilian oversight bodies has
been and continues to be a significant source of controversy.”).
213 For example, the ordinance establishing the Albuquerque Police Oversight Board requires
that members “have not been employed by law enforcement for one year prior to appointment.”
ALBUQUERQUE, N.M., CODE § 9-4-1-5(B)(1) (2019).
214 For example, the job description for investigator position at Chicago’s Civilian Office of
Police Accountability notes that preference will be given to candidates who have prior experience
as a sworn law enforcement officer, while also noting that, by ordinance, the agency cannot hire
anyone who worked in the Chicago Police Department for the preceding five years. Bid/Job
Announcement, CHI., ILL., CIVILIAN OFFICE OF POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY, http://
www.chicagocopa.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/Investigator-Job-posting-May-2019.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2CQW-AXL4].
215 Savage, supra note 209, at 902–03.
216 CHI., ILL., CODE § 2-78-120(s) (2019).
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Among the civilian oversight entities created in the past five years,
many have chosen to codify a restriction on hiring or appointing members
with prior law enforcement experience. Some jurisdictions prohibit the
hiring or appointment of professionals with prior law enforcement
experience altogether.217 Others choose to preclude only those
individuals who have worked for the police agency being overseen.218
Yet others, like Chicago, place a time restriction on prior law
enforcement work.219 Some jurisdictions also prohibit individuals who
have family members in law enforcement from serving in an oversight
capacity.220
For example, Seattle’s civilian oversight ordinance requires the
Office of Police Accountability (OPA) to transition to an all-civilian staff
at the level of supervisor and above, but allows for sworn professionals
to continue to serve as investigators and intake personnel.221 However,
the ordinance anticipates that the Inspector General will evaluate the level
of civilianization of OPA intake and investigator personnel, which could

217 See, e.g., SACRAMENTO, CAL., CODE § 2.110.040 (2019) (“No past or present peace officer,
or current employee of the city, shall be appoint to the [Sacramento Community Police Review]
commission.”). The Civilian Oversight Board in St. Louis allows only one of its seven board
members, at any given time, to have previously been “a commissioned employee of any municipal,
state, or federal law enforcement agency.” ST. LOUIS, MO., REV. CODE § 3.140.030(3).
218 See, e.g., TAMPA, FLA., CODE § 18-8(e) (2019) (prohibiting previous employees of the
Tampa Police Department from joining the Tampa Citizens Review Board); ST. LOUIS, MO., REV.
CODE § 3.140.030(2) (prohibiting any employee of the City of St. Louis or the State of Missouri
from becoming members of the Civilian Oversight Board); id. § 3.140.030(1) (prohibiting placing
current or former commissioned employees of the St. Louis Police Department on the Civilian
Oversight Board’s investigative staff); NEWARK, N.J., REV. GEN. ORDINANCES § 2:2-86.1(a)(2)(c)
(2019) (stating that no former employees of the Newark Police Department may be a member of
the Civilian Complaint Review Board); DALL., TEX., CODE § 37-31(d)(2) (2019) (stating that
members of the fifteen-member Community Police Oversight Board may not be employed by the
Police Department).
219 Albuquerque has a shorter time restriction than Chicago, prohibiting law enforcement
employment only in the prior year. ALBUQUERQUE, N.M., CODE § 9-4-1-5(B) (2019).
220 The St. Louis Civilian Oversight Board will not accept anyone who has an immediate family
member that is currently employed by the St. Louis Police Department. ST. LOUIS., MO., REV.
CODE § 3.140.030(2). In addition to prohibiting participation by some former law enforcement
officers, the Tampa Citizens Review Board does not allow anyone who is directly related to a city
employee to become a member. TAMPA, FLA., CODE § 18-8(e). The Dallas Community Police
Oversight Board also excludes immediate family members of Dallas Police Department employees.
DALL., TEX., CODE § 37-31(d)(2).
221 Seattle, Wash., Ordinance 125315 § 3.29.140(A) (June 1, 2017) (“The OPA Director and the
Deputy Director shall be civilians, and within 18 months of the effective date of the ordinance
introduced as Council Bill 118969, all investigative supervisors shall be civilian.”); id.
§ 3.29.140(C) (“Within 12 months of the effective date of the ordinance introduced as Council Bill
118969, intake and investigator personnel shall be entirely civilian or a mix of civilian and sworn,
in whatever staffing configuration best provides for continuity, flexibility, leadership opportunity,
and specialized expertise, and supports public trust in the complaint-handling process.”).
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lead to further restrictions on the continued employment of sworn
officers.222
Dallas has taken a different approach. The fifteen-member, allcivilian Dallas Community Oversight Board223 is complemented by the
Technical Resource Panel (TRP), which is comprised of three individuals
who each have at least ten years of law enforcement experience and are
appointed by the City Manager.224 However, active law enforcement
professionals employed in Dallas County by state or local government
agencies are excluded from eligibility.225 TRP members are expected to
use their policing expertise and experience to assist the Board in its
review and investigation of incidents and misconduct allegations.226
Members of the TRP are permitted to attend and participate fully in all
Board meetings and deliberations.227 However, they are not entitled to
vote as members of the Board.228
In addition to its impact on hiring and appointment criteria,
civilianness can also be reflected in an entity’s operational approach,
organizational structure, values, and communication methods. Because
the work of police oversight often arises from and is intertwined with
internal police department activity, the operational methods of civilian
oversight entities are often modeled on police department protocols.
Similarly, many oversight entities develop hierarchical structures that
emulate those in law enforcement organizations. Moreover, because the
written work product of oversight entities is utilized in official
department disciplinary processes, it often relies on specialized law
enforcement concepts and terminology that lack meaning to lay readers.
These factors can upset the balance of civilianness of an entity’s culture.
A recent study on the issue of civilianness revealed that some former
police officers working in police oversight “brought with them police
investigative mindsets, rank-based attitudes,” and “certain ways of
working with police officers under investigation.”229 There are
institutional elements that can counter this kind of pro–law enforcement
bias. For example, close, effective supervision of investigations and
reviews can help ensure that law enforcement bias does not creep into the
process.230 Senior staff members committed to neutrality can challenge
the decisions and actions of investigative staff members with law

222
223
224
225
226
227
228
229
230

Id. § 3.29.140(F).
DALL., TEX., CODE § 37-31(a), (d).
Id. § 37-36(a)–(b).
Id. § 37-36(c).
Id. § 37-36(f).
Id. § 37-36(e).
Id.
Savage, supra note 209, at 902.
See id.
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enforcement backgrounds.231 Moreover, a strong and consistently
enforced agency-wide commitment to fairness and neutrality can be a
countervailing influence on oversight professionals who overly rely on
their prior law enforcement experience.232
The cultural challenge for oversight entities is to strike the right
balance. Entities that are high on the “civilianness” continuum risk being
perceived by outsiders as lacking sufficient professionalism and expertise
in law enforcement matters to provide effective oversight. On the other
hand, entities that are low on the “civilianness” continuum risk being
perceived as biased toward or lacking independence from the police
agency being monitored. Civilian oversight leaders should be mindful of
this dichotomy when defining hiring criteria and designing organizational
structures.
D.

Continued Backlash from Police Unions and Leadership

Since the concept of civilian oversight was first raised almost a
century ago, police unions, police officials, and police organizations have
worked to undermine it.233 The survey revealed that efforts to impede the
creation of and minimize the powers of civilian entities by these
stakeholders continues in full force. The following are some examples of
recent conflicts in which police unions and other stakeholders attempted
to eliminate or otherwise minimize the scope of civilian oversight.
1.

Chicago, Illinois

In March 2019, the Fraternal Order of Police Lodge No. 7 (FOP)
sought an injunction against the City, claiming that investigators working
for the Civilian Office of Police Accountability (COPA) are not qualified
to investigate fatal incidents involving the Chicago Police Department
because they are not “state-qualified law enforcement officers.”234 The
local Chicago FOP union had filed a similar suit in 2016 against COPA’s

Id.
Id.
233 Alpert et al., supra note 7, at 182 (“The backlash against citizen oversight by police unions,
police officials and associations, including the International Association of Chiefs of Police,
continued to limit the viability of citizen review boards.”); see also Iris, supra note 9, at 219
(“Police union opposition to [civilian oversight] boards can be strident.”).
234 David Struett, Police Union Says COPA Isn’t Qualified to Investigate Officer Shootings,
CHI. SUN-TIMES (Mar. 15, 2019, 11:08 PM), https://chicago.suntimes.com/2019/3/15/18420886/
police-union-says-copa-isn-t-qualified-to-investigate-officer-shootings [https://perma.cc/2CQWAXL4].
231
232
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predecessor agency, the Independent Police Review Authority, which
was dismissed in 2017.235
2.

Cincinnati, Ohio

In July 2018, a Hamilton County, Ohio, judge ruled that Cincinnati’s
Citizen Complaint Authority could not interview officers involved in a
shooting until the subject’s criminal case was resolved.236 The ruling
resolved a conflict between the oversight entity and the Hamilton County
Prosecutor over when the agency had the right to question police
officers.237 The police union heralded the news of the ruling in a
Facebook post.238
3.

Newark, New Jersey

When Newark created the Citizen Complaint Review Board in 2016,
the police union filed a lawsuit claiming that the Board’s subpoena power
violated an officer’s right to due process.239 A New Jersey Superior Court
judge issued an order stripping the Board of its subpoena power, stating
that the civilian makeup of the Board could potentially lead to politicized
disciplinary recommendations.240 In June 2019, a New Jersey appellate
court unanimously overruled the lower court and reinstated the Board’s
powers, concluding that it could provide oversight by “investigating
alleged police misconduct, conducting hearings, participating in the
development of a disciplinary matrix, making recommendations, and
issuing subpoenas.”241 Notably, in October 2019, the New Jersey
Supreme Court granted the police union’s petition for certification.242

235 Fraternal Order of Police, Chi. Lodge 7 v. City of Chicago, No. 2016 CH 16529, 2017 WL
4070875 (Ill. Cir. Ct. July 17, 2017).
236 Jennifer Baker, Judge: Citizen Police Review Board Can’t Interview Cops Before Criminal
Cases Resolved, FOX19 NOW (July 20, 2018, 11:59 AM), http://www.fox19.cm/story/38691055/
judge-citizen-police-oversight-board-cant-interview-cops-before-criminal-cases-resolved [https://
perma.cc/7H59-XCH4].
237 Id.
238 Id.
239 Fraternal Order of Police, Newark Lodge No. 12 v. City of Newark, 212 A.3d 454, 469 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div.), cert. granted, 218 A.3d 1164 (N.J. 2019).
240 Judge Strips Subpoena Power from Civilian Oversight Board, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Mar. 15,
2018, https://apnews.com/4708ade1ac264baba5abca8efe940c7d [https://perma.cc/QP72-D7FW].
241 Fraternal Order of Police, 212 A.3d at 488.
242 Fraternal Order of Police, Newark Lodge No. 12 v. City of Newark, 218 A.3d 1168 (N.J.
2019).
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Tennessee

Following a city-wide referendum in November 2018, Nashville’s
Metro Council elected an eleven-member Community Oversight Board
to investigate allegations of misconduct made against the Nashville
Police Department.243 In reaction, Republican leaders in the Tennessee
House of Representatives proposed legislation to limit the subpoena
power of the Nashville oversight entity as well as other oversight entities
across the state.244 Although lawmakers denied that the Fraternal Order
of Police prompted the legislative proposal, the Board’s subpoena power
had been among the issues against which the police union had
vehemently fought leading up to the ballot initiative.245 After revisions
were made, the law was passed by both chambers of the Tennessee
legislature in April 2019.246 The statute, as enacted, does not permit
oversight agencies to have independent subpoena powers, but does allow
entities to seek a subpoena through the local city council, which has
subpoena power under state law.247 In addition to proscribing subpoena
power, the new law prohibits boards from basing membership eligibility
solely on demographics, economic status, and job history.248
The statute was quickly signed by Tennessee’s governor and went
into effect in May 2019.249 Despite the issues the Nashville oversight
entity may face, the bill is not expected to significantly impact the
Memphis civilian oversight entity. In 2016, the Memphis Civilian Law
Enforcement Review Board sought an opinion from the Tennessee
Attorney General as to whether state law at that time allowed the Board
to have direct subpoena power.250 The Memphis City Council briefly
considered bestowing subpoena power on the entity, but did not follow
243 Natalie Allison, Tennessee Republicans File Bill Stripping Nashville Police Oversight
Board’s Subpoena Powers, TENNESSEAN (Feb. 4, 2019, 6:29 PM), https://www.tennessean.com/
story/news/politics/2019/02/04/police-oversight-board-subpoena-power-tennessee-house-bill/
2773233002 [https://perma.cc/J9YY-KGP3].
244 Id.
245 Id.
246 Natalie Allison, Bill Restricting Community Oversight Boards’ Subpoena Power Heads to
Gov. Bill Lee’s Desk, TENNESSEAN (Apr. 18, 2019, 2:39 PM), https://www.tennessean.com/story/
news/politics/2019/04/18/police-oversight-board-subpoena-power-tennessee-bill/3509851002
[https://perma.cc/XXW5-CV35].
247 Id.
248 Act of Apr. 18, 2019, 2019 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 320. In addition to taking away subpoena
power, the Act requires the members of civilian oversight boards to be registered voters. Id. § 1(c).
The Act also restricts the public dissemination of reports issued by oversight entities. Id. § 1(a).
249 Act of Apr. 18, 2019, 2019 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 320 (showing that the bill was passed April
18, 2019, then signed by Governor Bill Lee on May 8, 2019).
250 Bill Dries, CLERB Subpoena Power Remains Issue After Council Vote, MEMPHIS DAILY
NEWS (Aug. 15, 2016), https://www.memphisdailynews.com/news/2016/aug/15/clerb-subpoenapower-remains-issue-after-council-vote [https://perma.cc/H9YV-EMCL].
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through based on the advice and counsel of a city attorney, who suggested
that the Board could compel a witness to testify by utilizing the City
Council’s subpoena power.251
5.

Tulsa, Oklahoma

If the Tulsa mayor has his way, that city would create an oversight
entity called the Office of the Independent Monitor.252 That agency would
be empowered to follow up on citizen complaints, review investigations
of use-of-force incidents conducted by the Tulsa Police Internal Affairs
department, review best practices and make policy recommendations,
and conduct community outreach.253 According to a letter to the mayor
that was not intended for public release, the Tulsa police union intends to
push back against the mayor’s plans, claiming that the creation of the
independent monitoring function will violate the terms of the police
contract.254
E.

Sub-Optimization of Powers Resulting from Compromise

The survey supports an historical observation about civilian
oversight of law enforcement: oversight entities are typically created
from a cyclical process of scandal, followed by debate, followed by
reform.255 A scandal sparks debate about accountability, which results in
the implementation of reforms that incorporate new or enhanced
oversight. The cycle then repeats when the next scandal occurs.

Id.
Kevin Canfield, Mayor Outlines Proposal for Independent Police Monitoring, TULSA
WORLD (Apr. 10, 2019), https://www.tulsaworld.com/news/local/government-and-politics/mayoroutlines-proposal-for-independent-police-monitoring/article_eb60a8de-7693-5de1-9848396b00470e99.html [https://perma.cc/G8BY-7PCL.]
253 Id.
254 Tulsa Police Union Says Independent Monitor Would Violate Contract, LABOR RELATIONS
INFO. SYS. (Jan. 30, 2019), https://lris.com/2019/01/30/tulsa-police-union-says-independentmonitor-would-violate-contract [https://perma.cc/QW9W-L4GY].
255 Prenzler, supra note 5, at 3.
251
252
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Figure 13: Reform Cycle Schematic

The evolution of civilian oversight in Chicago is emblematic of this
kind of episodic reform. In 1960, an investigation revealed that eight
Chicago police officers participated in a large-scale burglary ring in the
Summerdale area of north Chicago by acting as lookouts and helping cart
away the loot.256 The scandal that ensued led to the establishment of the
Chicago Police Board,257 which adjudicates the more serious disciplinary
matters involving Chicago police officers.258
In 1973, a group of almost three dozen police officers faced
allegations of abuse, brutality, and false arrest in a federal lawsuit.259 The
complaint alleged that the Superintendent of Police, the Chicago Police
Board, and the City of Chicago “willfully refused to investigate or punish
police misconduct.”260 The lawsuit and other reports of police brutality
led to the creation of Office of Professional Standards (OPS) in 1974.261
Although still residing within the police department, OPS was comprised
of all civilian investigators and was responsible for examining citizen
complaints of excessive force by police and all shootings by Chicago
police officers.262

256 See Stephan Benzkofer, The Summerdale Scandal and the Case of the Babbling Burglar,
CHI. TRIB. (July 7, 2013, 2:00 AM), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-per-flashsummerdale-0707-20130707-story.html [https://perma.cc/6FHY-3JTS].
257 Dan Hinkel et al., Consent Decree for CPD Drafted Plan by Mayor, State Attorney General
Aims for Long-Lasting Change, CHI. TRIB., July 29, 2018, at 1.
258 See supra text accompanying note 25.
259 Robert McClory, Black Reformers Launch: Major Attack on Police Brutality, CHI. DAILY
DEFENDER, Feb. 3, 1973, at 4.
260 Elizabeth J. Andonova, Cycle of Misconduct: How Chicago Has Repeatedly Failed To Police
Its Police, 10 DEPAUL J. FOR SOC. JUST. 1, 7 (2017) (quoting McClory, supra note 259, at 4).
261 Id. at 7–8, 30.
262 See William A. Geller & Kevin J. Karales, Shootings of and by Chicago Police: Uncommon
Crises, Part I: Shootings by Chicago Police, 72 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1813, 1828–29
(1981).
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Scandals continued to erupt throughout the thirty-plus years that
OPS was in operation.263 When yet another police-brutality incident
rocked the city in 2007, additional reforms were implemented to quell
community criticism.264 The City Council created a new independent city
agency, the Independent Police Review Authority, to investigate
complaints of certain types of police-misconduct allegations, including
use-of-force incidents.265 Unfortunately, not even a decade later, the
highly controversial shooting of Laquan McDonald by Chicago police
officer Jason Van Dyke, and the City’s reluctance to publicly release
video of the incident, sparked community outrage and inflamed the
already-simmering mistrust of Chicago’s police accountability system.266
The City scuttled the IPRA and replaced it with the Civilian Office of
Police Accountability and the newly created position of Deputy Inspector
General for Public Safety within the City’s Office of Inspector General.267
Some jurisdictions have recognized the challenge in avoiding this
scandal-debate-reform cycle. For example, in the ordinance creating its
new civilian oversight system, Seattle explicitly acknowledged that one
of the goals was to create “a comprehensive and lasting police oversight
system.”268
Some commentators hypothesize that this repeated cycle results
from the fact that oversight structures are often the product of political
compromise between stakeholders who, on the one hand, support the
concept of independent oversight, and, on the other, those who question
its legitimacy and seek to limit its impact.269 For example, the Citizens
Police Review Board recently created in Dallas is, by and large,
considered the product of compromise.270

Andonova, supra note 260, at 30.
See Beyond Repair: Chicago’s Independent Police Review Authority, CHI. TRIB. (Apr. 8,
2016, 3:34 PM), https://www.chicagotribune.com/opinion/editorials/ct-ipra-laquan-policeoversight-emanuel-chicago-edit-0410-jm-20160408-story.html [https://perma.cc/2S23-S4LP].
265 CHI., ILL., CODE § 2-57 (2015) (repealed 2016).
266 See Beyond Repair, supra note 264.
267 See discussion supra Section III.C.
268 Seattle, Wash., Ordinance 125315 § 1(K) (June 1, 2017) (emphasis added).
269 See, e.g., Prenzler, supra note 5, at 5 (“Civilian review involves a mixed model and a clear
political compromise between supporters and opponents of fully independent systems.”).
270 Stephen Young, Citizens Police Review Board Revamp Passes Unanimously, DALL.
OBSERVER (Apr. 25, 2019, 4:00 AM), https://www.dallasobserver.com/news/dallas-council-signsoff-on-police-review-board-11648429 [https://perma.cc/2LZE-2PMP] (“The new board won’t be
as strong as activists wanted it to be and is probably a little stronger than Dallas’ police associations
would’ve preferred”); see also Editorial, The Dallas City Council’s Compromise on Police
Oversight Is a Win for Transparency and Accountability, DALL. MORNING NEWS (Apr. 26, 2019,
3:00 AM), https://www.dallasnews.com/opinion/editorials/2019/04/26/the-dallas-city-councilscompromise-on-police-oversight-is-a-win-for-transparency-and-accountability [https://perma.cc/
22WU-A9J4].
263
264
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Controversies related to police accountability are often “protracted
and bitter.”271 For example, the acquittal of the four White officers
accused of the infamous 1991 beating of Rodney King sparked days of
rioting in Los Angeles, during which fifty-five people were killed and
more than eight hundred buildings were destroyed.272 The highly
publicized, controversial shooting of Laquan McDonald led to significant
political upheaval in and around Chicago, and the mayor and Cook
County State’s Attorney faced widespread suspicion of a cover-up.273
Within months, the State’s Attorney was voted out of office.274
Stakeholders on both sides of the civilian oversight debate harbor
deeply held convictions and beliefs. In many jurisdictions, the structure
and powers of oversight entities are necessarily the product of
compromise. That being the case, the systems that emerge often lack the
full complement of powers necessary to provide sustainably effective
oversight or to spur the transformative police reform the community
expects. Community leaders developing proposals should recognize the
importance of generating broad-based political support for proposed
initiatives. Doing so will minimize the whittling away of critical
oversight powers for the purpose of reaching the consensus necessary to
shepherd reforms through the political process.
F.

Perceived Lack of Professionalism or Expertise

The opponents of civilian oversight typically offer three
explanations for why civilian oversight is unnecessary or inappropriate:
(1) police agencies are capable of disciplining their own, (2) misconduct
is not as widespread as the media has led the public to believe, and (3)
oversight would undermine police in the performance of their jobs.275
Many members within the law enforcement community view the term
“civilian” with suspicion and have difficulty believing that civilian
professionals have the expertise to judge how officers conduct

271 Prenzler, supra note 5, at 8; see also Iris, supra note 9, at 220 (“Often the issue of civilian
review becomes a very hot political item.”).
272 Prenzler, supra note 5, at 11.
273 Alvarez Defends Herself, Mayor Emanuel in Timing of Charges in Laquan McDonald Case,
NBC CHI. (Nov. 24, 2015, 3:20 PM), https://www.nbcchicago.com/blogs/ward-room/AlvarezOpponents-Question-Timeline-of-Release-of-McDonald-Video-353183351.html
[https://
perma.cc/6WPA-2Z4U].
274 Top Chicago Prosecutor Loses Primary Focused On Handling Of Police Killing, GUARDIAN
(Mar. 15, 2016, 10:37 pm), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/mar/15/chicagoprosecutor-anita-alvarez-loses-primary-kim-foxx-laquan-mcdonald
[https://perma.cc/37NDAAW4] (“Voters backed Kim Foxx’’ in Democratic race amid criticisms that Anita Alvarez’s
office waited over a year to charge officer for fatal shooting of Laquan McDonald”).
275 Alpert et al., supra note 7, at 182.
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themselves.276 Most notably, police unions and leaders frequently argue
that investigating police misconduct requires the “unique investigative
expertise of police.”277 This assertion “ignores the wide range of
investigative functions carried out in the public and private domains and
the long-term capacity of oversight agencies to train nonpolice
investigators.”278 For example, in preparation for the launch of Chicago’s
Civilian Office of Police Accountability, agency management required
all investigative staff members to undergo five to six weeks of training.279
In fact, many jurisdictions have reflected the importance of training by
including training requirements in the establishing ordinances of recently
created oversight entities.280
CONCLUSION
The recent expansion of civilian oversight, and the fact that many
civilian oversight entities have operated for decades, illustrates that
civilian oversight has moved into the mainstream as an important
component of any police accountability system. The Review function
continues to be the most prevalent form of oversight,281 despite the
relative lack of power and independence inherent in that form, as
compared to other types of oversight such as the Investigative and
Supervisory forms.282 Some commentators argue that the effectiveness of
civilian oversight writ large will continue to suffer so long as jurisdictions
continue to rely heavily on the Review form of civilian oversight.283

276 Iris, supra note 9, at 219 (commenting that officers see civilians as “outside the police
subculture” and believe that they “do not understand the types of people (sociopaths, drunks, etc.)
with whom the police must routinely deal”).
277 See Prenzler, supra note 5, at 7.
278 Id.
279 Organizational Development, CIVILIAN OFFICE OF POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY,
https://www.chicagocopa.org/about-copa/organizational-development
[https://perma.cc/T36D9RB5]. The author of this Article was involved in the creation and execution of this training
program during their tenure as Chief Administrator.
280 See, e.g., OAKLAND, CAL., CODE § 2.45.190 (2019) (detailing training requirements for
members of the Police Commission); id. § 2.46.030(C) (requiring all investigators employed by the
Community Police Review Agency to “receive any necessary training in conducting fair and
impartial investigations”); TAMPA, FLA., CODE § 18-8(g)(2) (2019); WICHITA, KAN., CODE
§ 2.10.045(a) (2019); ST. LOUIS, MO., REV. CODE § 3.1040.040(8) (2019); NEWARK, N.J., REV.
GEN. ORDINANCES § 2:2-86.3(h) (2019); ALBUQUERQUE, N.M., CODE § 9-4-1-5(F) (2019); see
also Omaha, Neb., Exec. Order No. S-30-15 Amended § III (Aug. 10, 2016).
281 See supra Section II.B.
282 See supra Section I.B.
283 Prenzler, supra note 5, at 11 (“The potential of civilian oversight in the United States
continues to be undermined by attachment to the review model.”).
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The trend towards the creation of multi-layered, multi-functional
systems284 indicates that jurisdictions are opting to invest more resources
in civilian oversight to achieve better results. The costs of implementing
civilian oversight can be substantial, particularly regarding the
Investigative function.285 Although the work done by civilian oversight
entities arguably is work that would otherwise be done by the subject law
enforcement agency,286 there are certainly incremental overhead costs
from operating one or more separate entities to provide oversight
functions.
Now that civilian oversight has become mainstream and oversight
systems are becoming increasingly complex, there should be greater
focus on evaluating their effectiveness. To be sure, there is much debate
about how to evaluate the effectiveness of accountability systems. There
are a number outcomes that could be considered, from objective
measures, such as the timeliness of investigations and the number of
officers being held accountable, to more subjective measures, such as the
quality, thoroughness, and neutrality of agency determinations and
recommendations, as well as community perceptions of policing and
accountability within the jurisdiction. Future research into the costbenefit tradeoffs of civilian oversight in its many forms is warranted to
help municipalities better assess options and design systems that best suit
their needs. This suggestion is by no means intended to imply that civilian
oversight might be a failed experiment. To the contrary, civilian oversight
has been around for decades because it serves an important purpose and,
thus, is clearly here to stay. The question is not whether the investments
being made across the country in these complex systems are paying off,
but, rather, how these systems can be optimized to provide the most
effective and efficient oversight possible.

See supra Section II.C.
Cf. Prenzler, supra note 5, at 7 (“Putting the [civilian oversight] model into practice involves
a significant cost.”).
286 Id. (noting that “one obvious answer” to concerns about the financial costs of civilian
oversight is the fact that the work would have to be done anyway and thus “is simply a matter of
shifting resources”).
284
285
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APPENDIX A: ENTITIES CREATED JANUARY 2014 TO JUNE 2019
City
Rank

City

Year
Est.

Primary
Role

32

Albuquerque, NM

2014

INV

32
1

Albuquerque, NM
New York, NY

2014
2014

REV
AUD

40

Omaha, NE

2014

APP

62
52
54

St. Louis, MO
Tampa, FL
Aurora, CO

2014
2015
2016

REV
REV
ADJ

3

Chicago, IL

2016

INV

3

Chicago, IL

2015

AUD

70

Newark, NJ

2016

REV

45

Oakland, CA

2016

INV

45

Oakland, CA

2016

SUP

35

Sacramento, CA

2016

ADV

30

Baltimore, MD

2017

ADV

18

Seattle, WA

2017

AUD

55
81

Anaheim, CA
Buffalo, NY

2018
2018

ADV
ADV

50

Wichita, KS

2018

REV

11

Austin, TX

2019

REV

9

Dallas, TX

2019

ADV

9

Dallas, TX

2019

REV

24

NashvilleDavidson, TN

2019

INV

Name
Civilian Police Oversight
Agency
Police Oversight Board
Inspector General for NYPD
Citizen Complaint Review
Board
Civilian Oversight Board
Citizens Review Board
Independent Review Board
Civilian Office of Police
Accountability
OIG/Public Safety Inspector
General
Civilian Complaint Review
Board
Community Police Review
Agency
Police Commission
Community Police Review
Commission
Community Oversight Task
Force
Office of the Inspector General
for Public Safety
Police Review Board
Community Advisory Board
Wichita Citizens Review
Board
Office of Police Oversight
Community Police Oversight
Board
Office of Community Police
Oversight
Community Oversight Board
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APPENDIX B: CIVILIAN OVERSIGHT ENTITIES CREATED IN 1999 OR
EARLIER
City
Rank

City

Year
Est.

Primary
Role

62

St. Louis, MO

1861

SUP

31

Milwaukee, WI

1885

SUP

2

Los Angeles, CA

1920s

SUP

56

Honolulu, HI

1932

SUP

37

Kansas City, MO

1939

SUP

2

Los Angeles, CA

1953
or
earlier

ADJ

1

New York, NY

1953

INV

5

Philadelphia, PA

1958

REV

3

Chicago, IL

1960

ADJ

37

Kansas City, MO

1970

REV

71

Lincoln, NE

1970s

ADV

23

Detroit, MI

1974

SUP

8

San Diego, CA

1980s

REV

13

San Francisco, CA

1982

INV

51

Cleveland, OH

1984

REV

97

Richmond, VA

1984

SUP

16

Indianapolis, IN

1990

REV

39

Long Beach, CA

1990

REV

46

Minneapolis, MN

1990

INV

Name
Board of Police
Commissioners
Milwaukee Police and Fire
Commission
Board of Police
Commissioners
Honolulu Police
Commission
Board of Police
Commissioners
Board of Rights
Citizens Complaint Review
Board
Police Advisory
Commission
Chicago Police Board
Office of Community
Complaints
Citizen Police Advisory
Board
Board of Police
Commissioners
Community Review Board
on Police Practices
Department of Police
Accountability
Civilian Police Review
Board
Citizens Police Review
Commission
Citizens Police Complaint
Board
Citizens Police Complaint
Commission
Office of Police Conduct
Review
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Minneapolis, MN

1990

AUD

46

Minneapolis, MN

1990

ADJ

79

St. Petersburg, FL

1991

REV

74

Toledo, OH

1991

APP

27

Oklahoma City, OK

1992

REV

72

Orlando, FL

1992

REV

10

San Jose, CA

1993

REV

63

St. Paul MN

1993

REV

89

Winston-Salem,
NC

1993

APP

25

Memphis, TN

1994

INV

2

Los Angeles, CA

1995

AUD

65

Pittsburgh, PA

17
33
30
98
28

Charlotte, NC
Tucson, AZ
Baltimore, MD
Boise, ID
Las Vegas, NV

1996–
97
1997
1997
1999
1999
1999

APP
REV
INV
INV
REV

35

Sacramento, CA

1999

REV

20
20

Washington, DC
Washington, DC

1999
1999

INV
REV

INV

[2020

Police Conduct Oversight
Commission
Police Conduct Review
Panel
Civilian Police Review
Committee
Civilian Police Review
Board
Citizens Advisory Board
Citizen’s Police Review
Board
Office of the Independent
Police Auditor
Police Civilian Internal
Affairs Review Commission
Citizen’s Police Review
Board
Civilian Law Enforcement
Review Board
LAPD Office of the
Inspector General
Citizen Police Review
Board
Citizens Review Board
Independent Police Auditor
Civilian Review Board
Office of Police Oversight
Citizen Review Board
Office of Public Safety
Accountability
Office of Police Complaints
Police Complaints Board

